Changing the cannabis policy or, Is the most powerful cannabis law the law of supply and demand? by Pfauter, Saskia.
SASKIA PFAUTER 
- CHANGING THE CANNABIS POLICY -
Or 
IS THE MOST POWERFUL CANNABIS LAW 
THELAWOFSUPPLYANDDEMAND? 
LLM RESEARCH PAPER 
LAW 522 /LAW and MARKETS 
LAW FACULTY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
2005 
l NIVE... I ') ·~ I I G OJII 
r "', ,, , .:.. 
Ot<;Upr 1 ,, , 11uui 
LIB RY 
Table of Content 
I INTRODUCTION 
II WHY POLICY MAKERS SHOULD 
ADDRESS THE CANNABIS ISSUE 
A Compliance, Public Opinion and Law Enforcement 
B Economic Considerations as Basis 
III THE FREE MARKET: 
A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
B 
1 
2 
3 
C 
D 
IS INTERVENTION NECESSARY? 
Economic Goals 
Increase welfare through allocative efficiency 
Structure of a free cannabis market 
Theory and praxis 
Market failures 
a -Monopoly-
b - Externalities-
C - Information asymmetries-
Paternalistic Concerns 
Paternalism 
Addiction 
Young people 
Ethical Concerns 
Further Points to Consider 
-1-
--I-
--I-
-5-
-6-
-6-
-6-
-7-
-7-
-8-
-8-
-9-
-13-
-1-1-
-1-1-
-16-
-1 7-
-18-
-19-
E Summary 
IV THE CURRENT POLICIES 
AND THE BLACK MARKET 
V 
A 
B 
C 
A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
B 
1 
2 
3 
4 
C 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Prohibition and its Impact on Consumption 
Costs Created by a Black Market 
Summary 
THE CURRENT APPROACHES 
Total Prohibition without Any Expediency Principle 
Does it address the failures of a free market? 
Does it address paternalistic concerns? 
Ethical concerns 
Further points to consider 
Total Prohibition with Expediency Principle 
Does it address the failures of a free market? 
Does it address paternalistic concerns? 
Ethical concerns 
Further points to consider 
Prohibition with Civil Penalties 
Does it address the failures of a free market? 
Does it address paternalistic concerns? 
Ethical concerns 
Further points to consider 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
-20-
-21-
-22-
-23-
-24-
-2.J-
-2.J-
-25-
-25-
-26-
-26-
-2 7-
-2 7-
-28-
-29-
-29-
-31-
-31-
-32-
-32-
-33-
VI 
D 
1 
2 
3 
4 
E 
A 
Partial Prohibition 
Does it address the failures of a free market? 
Does it address paternalistic concerns? 
Ethical concerns 
Further points to consider 
Summary 
REGULATION AS ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Theory and Praxis 
B Cannabis and Alcohol -
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
C 
D 
E 
F 
Do Regulatory Tools Address the Failures 
of a Free Cannabis Market? 
- Taxes-
- Labelling duties and purity requirements-
-Bans-
- Licensing duties-
- Age restrictions-
- Restrictions on advertising-
How to deal with addicts? 
Some Tools Work! 
Ethical Concerns 
Further Points to Consider 
Summary 
-34-
-34-
-35-
-35-
-36-
-3 7-
-38-
-38-
-38-
-39-
--10-
--10-
--10-
--11-
-41-
--12-
--12-
--13-
--13-
--1-1-
VII 
VIII 
WHICH IS THE SUPERIOR APPROACH 
-A COMPARISON 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
Figures 
Tables 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
TABLE OF FIGURES 
--15-
--19-
Abstract 
Is the most powerful cannabis law the law of supply and demand? 
This question is controversial in the whole western world. This paper concludes that the answer to that 
question is not a clear yes, but that a change in the political approaches is advised. 
The UN Conventions call for a prohibitionist approach concerning cannabis. In accordance with that, 
the member states have implemented different strict prohibition policies. Interestingly, they 
implemented also grey zones in which it is up to the particular police officers or judges to enforce the 
cannabis law. This contradiction together with a changed public opinion about cannabis and its 
dangers should prompt policy makers to reconsider the current cannabis policies. 
This paper discuses arguments that come into consideration. Thereby it starts at the assumption that, 
from an economic viewpoint, a free and unregulated market is preferable. However, a free cannabis 
market would produce market failures in the shape of externalities and information asymmetries. 
Furthermore, it would create paternalistic concerns concerning youth and addict protection. As these 
concerns are of such a quality that they need to be addressed and due to the fact a free market does not 
address them by itself, the paper goes on to consider the current prohibition approaches . It outlines the 
ability of the different approaches to effectively address the failures of the free market and the 
paternalistic concerns. Furthermore, it considers ethical concerns and compliance issues. An 
assumption is made that an intervention approach is only justified if it effectively addresses the 
lowest-cost objectives. Using this assumption the paper examines the possibility of implementing a 
regulation approach. It goes on to elaborate how this approach would address the market failures, 
paternalistic and ethical concerns and compliance issues. 
After comparing the outcomes of the different approaches, this paper concludes that regulation is the 
preferable approach. 
Statement of word count: 
This paper contains 14,903 words (without front page, table of content, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendix). 
- Changing the cannabis policy -
Or 
Is the most powerful cannabis law the law of supply and demand? 
I INTRODUCTION 
Cannabis - a blessing or a curse? This question seems to bother politicians 
as well as "ordinary Joes" all over the world. 
In accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 as 
amended by the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs 1961 1 (Single Convention) and the UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 19882 (Drug Traffic Convention), 
cannabis and its consumption are more or less strict forbidden in the western 
world. In 1961 cannabis was, for the first time, added to the list of internationally 
controlled drugs. The Single Convention unambiguously condemns drug 
addiction. Article 49 of the Single Convention provides that "the use of cannabis 
for other than medical and scientific purposes must be discontinued as soon as 
possible". 3 
As the UN Conventions are not self-executing, parties must pass laws to 
carry out their provisions. However, not every country complies with the 
conventions in every detail. For example, although the conventions call for 
criminal penalties with no exception, there is nevertheless the civil penalty 
approach in parts of Australia. Futher, although the conventions call for a 
prohibition of every amount, there are "small-amount-exceptions" for cannabis 
purchase in many countries. 
1 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 (UN) . 
2 Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (UN). 
3Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 (UN), above n I. 
According to the World Drug Report 2005 approximately 161 million 
people, that is 4% of the world's population, consumed cannabis in 20044 (see 
Fig. I). The amount of cannabis consumption has increased in the last years and 
cannabis is the most famous illicit drug in the western world (see for example 
Figs. 2and 3).5 According to the United Nations, black markets for cannabis exist 
in 96% of countries6 and no government has ever been able to eliminate them. 
History shows that every country has fought a "war on drugs" in some time. Only 
the drug itself varies. Remarkably, the relationship between societies and drugs 
seems to be more than ambivalent. Why, for example, is cannabis prohibited in 
western countries, but alcohol , the most famous licit drug, allowed? With this 
question in the background, the call for a change of the cannabis policies has 
arisen in the last few years and some cannabis supporters have raised the 
regulated alcohol market as a possible solution. 
Alcohol is an addictive and intoxicating drug, but nevertheless allowed, 
even if regulated. It generates profit for farmers, retailers, manufacturers, 
advertisers and investors. It provides employment and generates tax revenues for 
society. Beside these positive affects, the patterns of alcohol drinking cause 
serious problems and costs for society.7 About 2000 million people drink alcohol 
in most parts of the world and in 2000 alcohol was responsible for 4 % of the 
global disease burden8. Alcohol is proved to be connected with crime, unsafe sex, 
accidents and the like. See, for example Figs. 5 and 6 that outline a few of the 
problems relating to regular heavy drinking and intoxication. 
Cannabis is, like alcohol, an intoxicant, consisting of several hemp species. 
The intoxicant effect is mainly caused through cannabinoids, like f.,. - 9 
Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) or Canabidiol (CBD). The Supporters of cannabis 
state that the intoxication helps to relax and broadens one ' s mind. In contrast, the 
adversaries refer to possible negative health effects and to costs for society. 
4 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime " World Drug Report 2005" (2005) E.05.XI. I O, p 23. 
5 
UNO DOC, " World Drug Report 2005", above n 4 , 29. 
6 
UNODOC, " World Drug Report, 2005", above n 4, 6. 
7 WHO, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse ,,Global Status Report on Alcohol 
2004" (WHO Geneva, 2004), 35-67. 
8 
WHO ·'Public health problems caused by harmful use of alcohol" ( 15 May 2005) WHA 58 .26, 
Agenda item 13 .14, I. 
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Although cannabis is an illicit drug, it is said to have an exceptional 
position in the drug discussion. It is distinguished from "hard drugs" like heroin or 
cocaine, because it appears to have less dangerous side effects, the sellers are not 
as brutal and associated with crime, and the consumers are more reasonable. 
It is questionable whether cannabis and its effects are comparable to 
alcohol and whether the alcohol model really would work for a cannabis market. 
The question is what kind of considerations policy makers should take into 
account when considering a change in the political approach to the cannabis issue. 
At the moment, the present discussion is emotive and seems mostly not 
objectively focused on problem solving. It is characterised by political, social, 
moral and even religious arguments. The discussion seems to have become stuck 
and a solution is not in sight. The problem for politicians is that there are no 
reliable research results in regard to cannabis consumption and its effects. The 
studies range from cannabis being highly dangerous to not dangerous at all, and 
few statements are really proved. Furthermore, different studies use different 
methods and every country has unique conditions. All these facts have to be 
considered while evaluating available data related to cannabis and its effects. 
This research paper applies economic considerations to determine a 
superior approach to the cannabis question. On the basis that, from an economic 
viewpoint, a free market should be the starting point, it outlines that the existence 
of externalities and paternalistic and ethical concerns justify governmental 
intervention. After that it presents the different manifestations of the present 
prohibition approach and analyses their ability to address desired policy goals. It 
turns then to regulation and has a comparable look to the present alcohol market. 
An overall comparison between the different approaches shows that regulation is 
the preferable approach. 
Therefore, the answer to the question whether the law of supply and 
demand is the most powerful cannabis law, is not a clear yes. Though regulation 
seems, at the first sight, not as effective as the prohibition approaches, it is the 
more flexible approach to address the concerns. It eliminates the black market, 
creates tax revenues and is in line with present public opinion about cannabis. 
3 
Therefore, a political change in the cannabis approach of the UN, and m 
consequence of the Member States as well, is advised. 
II WHY SHOULD POLICY MAKERS ADDRESS THE CANNABIS 
ISSUE? 
A Compliance, Public Opinion and Law Enforcement 
There are different reasons why people comply with law. Some comply 
with law, because they respect it and voluntarily accept governmental rules. 
Others comply, because they are deterred by effective law enforcement. 
The times in which a majority of citizens complied with cannabis law, 
only because it is law, seem to be gone. Today people challenge governments and 
their rules. The public opinion about cannabis has changed over the last decades.
9 
For instance, Fig. 4 shows the view of members of the Health Committee NZ on 
the legal status of cannabis in 2003. Most of them preferred legislation/regulation. 
People compare cannabis and its effects with alcohol and cigarettes. For example, 
in England most young adults, aged 16-19, believe that cannabis is less harmful 
than alcohol or that pursuing people for the possession of cannabis should have 
the lowest of priorities for the allocation of police resource.
10It seems unfair to 
send someone to prison only because of possession of cannabis. 
11 In New 
Zealand, for example, there are several petitions, which call for decriminalisation 
of cannabis. In 1999 alone there were four such petitions: 1999/114 Petition of 
Susan Dawn Peacock and 6 others, 1999/122 Petition of Fa'agolo Tualima 
WongKee and 20 others, 1999/157 Petition of Pastor Adam White and 157 others, 
and 1999/173 Petition of Owen Edgerton and 35,516 others. 12 
9 The Economist "Brixton lights up" (200 I) 360 The economist lss 8229; The Economist 
"Hysteria on Downing Street" (30 March 2000) The Economist < http: //www.economist.com> 
(last accessed O I. I 0.2005) ; John Carvel "Better education is making us nation of liberals" 
<http: //www.guardian. co.uk> (last accessed O I. I 0.2005); Nandor Tanczos MP "Time to get real 
about drug in schools" <http: //greens.org.nz> (last accessed O 1.10.2005). 
10 The Economist "Hysteria on Downing street", above n 9. 
11 Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare "The 2004 National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey" Drug Statistic Series No. I 3, 10. 
12 Report of the Health Committee "Inquiry into the public health strategies related to cannabis use 
and the most appropriate legal status" (presented to the House of Representatives, Wellington, 
August 2003) 66. 
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At the present, the dangers of cannabis are questioned and prohibition 
seems not reasonable any more. As a result the respect for prohibition in general 
decreases. 
Also the regulatory bodies seem to adjust their enforcement to a changed 
public opinion. The UN chose prohibition as its approach to the cannabis issue, 
and, in accordance with that, most western countries have taken the same 
approach. But cannabis legislation and practices are two different things. In fact, 
most countries have installed a "grey zone" in which it is up to the individual 
police officers or judges to apply the law. In Germany, for example, it is 
forbidden to cultivate, possess and buy cannabis, although consumption in small 
amounts is allowed. Surprisingly, it is possible, according to the highest courts in 
Germany, to consume cannabis without possessing it. A further contradiction is 
found in the Netherlands ' approach. Although there, cannabis purchase is still 
forbidden, selling it in small amounts in registered coffee-shops is tolerated. But 
the coffee-shops themselves are forced to buy their cannabis on the black market 
("back-door-problem"). 13 
The installed "grey zones" and the " laissez faire" enforcement policy 
intensify the problem with losing respect for the prohibition laws. There is no real 
deterrent effect and the differences between regulatory theory and praxis sets 
untrustworthy double standards. 
Both changed public opinion and ineffective law enforcement lead to 
circumvention of the present prohibition approaches by black market allocation. 
Therefore, policy makers should reconsider their cannabis approaches to find a 
reasonable and effective policy. 
B Economic Considerations as Basis 
Economic considerations are a helpful tool by reconsidering the current 
approaches, because they allow an objective analysis. In economic terms, the 
question is whether the possible approaches are efficient. Pareto efficiency, as one 
13 Ministry of Health Drug Policy in the Netherlands - Basic Principles and Enforcement in 
Practice (International Publication Series Health, Welfare and Sports, No 18 September 2003) 19. 
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way to define efficiency, states that a policy change is efficient when it is 
impossible to make any one better off, without, at the same time, making some 
one else worse off. 14 In regard to the different ways to influence a cannabis 
market, there would always somebody be worse off: sellers and purchasers, 
supporters or adversaries, because their preferences might be not met. Because of 
that strict requirement, Pareto efficiency is not practicable to judge the different 
approaches. Although Kaldor-Hick efficiency is also controversial, because not 
every argument can be measured in monetary terms, it is more practicable to 
compare the outcomes of the regulatory approaches in question. 15 Accordingly, 
efficiency is achieved if those who gain benefits could theoretically compensate 
those who are worse off. 16 In other words, it requires a cost-benefit analysis. 
A change in the current systems may be justified by reference to market 
failures and broader social and ethical concerns. Decisive is whether the possible 
approaches effectively address the desired goals and whether the benefits of a 
change outweighing its costs. 
III THE FREE MARKET: JS INTERVENTION NECESSARY? 
While deciding policy issues, policy makers should increase the welfare of 
society and meet public interest. 17 It is necessary to determine whether a change in 
the political system is able to meet this goal. In drug discussions, externalities and 
paternalism considerations play a decisive role and need to be considered. It is 
important to outline the economic as well as the non economic goals in detail. 
A Economic Goals 
1 Increase welfare through allocative efficiency 
Modem economics relies on the assumption that a general equilibrium 
established under the conditions of a perfect competition in a free market is 
14 
Trebilcock, Michael The limits of Freedom oifContract (MIT Press 1995) 7. 
15 ' ' 
1 
Ogus, A Regulation: l egal Form and Economic Theory (Claredon Press 2004), 25. 
6 Ogus, above n 15, 24. 
17 Ogus, above n 15, 29. 
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socially optimal (Invisible Hand Theorem). 18 Supply and demand would regulate 
the market outcomes to an equilibrium price. Neo-classical economists believe 
that two parties only enter in a voluntary transaction, if both feel that the exchange 
is likely to make them better off. 19 Otherwise, they would not have entered into it. 
As a result of the individual search to maximise one's utility, the social welfare 
itself increases. 2° Classical libertarians, too, prefer a free voluntary market, 
because in their view every individual should be free to do what he/ she wants to 
do. Therefore, the starting point for economic considerations in regard to the 
cannabis issue should also be the assumption that a free voluntary market is 
preferable. 
2 Structure of a free cannabis market 
At the moment, there is no free market for cannabis in the western world, 
therefore, one can only speculate about what a perfect free cannabis market would 
look like. In free cannabis markets, seller and purchaser would only enter in a 
contract, if both think that their preferences would be reflected in the contract. 
The purchasers would look for a reasonable price that would reflect the gain they 
hope to achieve. The sellers would only sell for a price that would cover their 
expenses and leave a reasonable profit. Supply and demand would lead to an 
equilibrium price, and, hence, to an increase of social welfare. The market 
participants would be better off. 
3 Theory and praxis 
This theoretical approach is questioned. Economists argue that a perfect 
competitive market is not likely to exist in practice.21 There might exist market 
failures, which need to be considered. Because of such failures, it is almost 
impossible to have a perfect "bilaterally voluntary and informed transaction"22 as 
required for a welfare enhancing transaction. 
18 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen law and Economics (4ed, Pearson Addison Wesley, Boston, 
2004) 45. 
19 Trebilcock, above n 14, 7. 
20 Ogus, above n 15 , 16. 
21 Trebilcock, above n 14, 7. 
22 Trebilcock, above n 14, 7. 
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A change of the cannabis approach into a total free market without 
regulation can, therefore, only be advised if there are no undesirable outcomes 
that are not corrected by the market itself and that are of such a quality that they 
justify a special form of intervention. As this paper starts on the assumption that, 
from an economic viewpoint, a free market is preferable, it assumes that an 
intervention model should be chosen, which best addresses the desired goals with 
least costs, but has fewest influences on the market itself. This is consistent with 
the assumption that not every kind of concern justifies every kind of intervention. 
4 Market failures 
As there is to date no total free market approach to cannabis, the question 
whether market failures would exist in such am market is a matter of theory. It 
seems that the failures of a free alcohol market are at least comparable, if not 
more serious. Generally market failures can arise from monopolies, externalities, 
information asymmetries and public goods.23 As cannabis and alcohol can never 
be a public good, the other sources of market failure are discussed. 
a - Monopoly -
A market situation is called a monopoly if there is only one provider of a 
kind of product. Such a market is characterised by a lack of competition. In regard 
to a possible cannabis market a monopoly is not expected. Even in the current 
black market structure there are many sellers and buyers. The sellers provide 
several "cannabis brands" and different products, depending on the different 
consumption forms. There is no reason to suspect a collusion of suppliers in a licit 
market, nor would cannabis create a natural monopoly. If one also considers the 
regulated alcohol market, one can see that there are lot of providers, which 
implement a broad variety of brands and products in the market place.This 
situation is transferable to the cannabis market. 
23 Cooter and Ulen, above 18, 44 - 47 . 
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b -Externalities-
More important in relation to cannabis consumption 1s the possible 
existence of externalities. Externalities are defined as the effect that a voluntary 
action of one or more people imposes on a third party without their consent.24 
Typically these effects are not expressed in the charged price. Thus this price does 
not reflect the real social costs. In case of negative effects/cost, this leads to a 
production of more units of the particular commodity than is socially desirable. 
However, there is almost no transaction that does not impose costs on others.25 
The problem is to define the point, at which the effects of an externality justifies 
intervention. 
- crime rate-
The drug related crime rate imposes costs on society, particularly the tax 
payers. While considering this point, one has to be aware that present research 
results indeed show a high crime rate related to cannabis. Nevertheless, it is often 
not clear what kind of crime is contained in such studies. One has to distinguish 
between several manifestations of crime and to ask whether they are externalities 
of a free cannabis market as such. First, there is crime related to the black market. 
This kind of crime, however, would not be an externality caused by a free market 
approach, because it would not create a black market. Second, the crime rate 
related only to the breach of special cannabis law, like prohibition statutes, would 
not exist neither, because such law would also not exist any more.26 The most 
controversial crime manifestation is crime committed by "stoned" consumers. But 
cannabis is not proven to be the cause of crimes like property damage or personal 
injury, although some criminal might be high while they commit their crimes.27 In 
contrast, the crime rate connected with alcohol is high.28 Because alcohol makes 
people lose their inhibitions, alcohol is connected with personal injury, rape and 
24 Ogus, above n 15, 35- 38. 
25 Trebilcock, above n 14, 58. 
26 See also: Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 66. 
27 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 19 . 
28 Nina Rehn and Robin Room and Griffith Edwards " Alcohol in the European Region, -
consumption, harm and policies" (WHO, Regional Office for Europe, 200 I) , 22 . 
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property injury. 29 Thirdly, the cannabis pnce m a free market would be 
determined by supply and demand. Thus, it is not expected that the cannabis price 
would be unaffordable high. A look to the present black market prices of cannabis 
shows that even now the prices are relatively low in comparison to those of other 
drugs (see Fig.7) Therefore, the rate of crime committed to get money to afford 
the cannabis such as theft, burglary and robbery, would not exceed the rate related 
to other normal commodities. To underline this assumption one can have a look to 
the alcohol issue. In fact, it is unlikely that someone commits crimes such as 
burglary, robbery and so on to be able to afford alcohol as commodity. Though, 
crimes like theft of alcohol are common. It is unlikely that this would be different 
for cannabis in a free market. An extraordinarily high crime rate is, therefore, not 
anticipated. 
- health hazards -
One further important issue to consider is the possible negative health 
effects of cannabis consumption. On the surface, this seems rather to be a 
paternalistic question, than an externality question, because possible health effects 
affect the consumer in the first place. Nevertheless, negative health effects lead to 
health costs and if the consumer does not pay treatment costs by him or herself, 
these costs are shifted to society as a whole. 30 If there is a public health care 
system, as in most western countries, tax payers are affected by the additional 
treatment costs. 
Alcohol is proved to be connected with several serious diseases. These 
diseases cause costs for society, particularly tax payers. If one compares the two 
disease burdens (see Fig. 8), one can see that the health care costs of alcohol 
outweigh the costs created by illicit drugs all together. The accident rate imposes 
additional costs on third parties, too. Fig. 9 sets out a list of possible accidents in 
connection with alcohol. These accidents not only injure the alcohol consumers as 
such, but also third parties. 
29 Susan E. Martin and Christopher D Maxwell "Trends in alcohol use, cocaine use and crime: 
1989-1998" (2004) Journal of Drug Issues < http://www2.criminology.fsu.edu> (last accessed 
01 .10.2005). 
30 
Adam Wagstaff and Alan Maynard Economic Aspects of the Illicit Drug Market and Drug 
Enforcement Policies in the United Kingdom (HMSO BOOKS, London 1988), 12-22. 
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A problem in determining the negative health effects of cannabis 
consumption is that there are no reliable research results. In addition there has 
been a call for cannabis to be used as medical treatment. 31 There are as many 
different studies as opinions and nothing has been proved. Negative effects of 
cannabis consumption in question are, for example, schizophrenia and paranoia, 
but whether cannabis really leads to serious psychological long term effects is not 
entirely clear. 32 A negative effect on the brain and mental functions has also not 
been proved. However, there are studies that show that harmful acute and chronic 
effects of cannabis are associated with frequent and heavier cannabis 
consumption.33 Potential chronic effects can include harm to the central nervous 
system (neurotoxicity, impaired cognitive functioning and cognitive decline), 
possible psychosis and damage to the respiratory, immune and cardiovascular 
systems.34 Most studies conclude that, at least, heavy consumption and abuse lead 
to negative health effects. According to the United Nations approximately 14% of 
the drug related treatment admissions in Europe and 29,7 % in the Oceania region 
were cannabis related (see Figs.9 and 10). 
Furthermore, one of the main consumption forms of cannabis is smoking. 
It is evident that the smoke of cannabis joints contains a higher concentration of 
carcinogenic ingredients that tobacco does. 35 This can cause lung cancer and other 
smoking related diseases and thus lead to health and treatment costs for society. 
Admittedly, the consumption rate of cannabis joints may be not as high as that of 
cigarettes. Whereas it might be "normal" to smoke one package of cigarettes a 
day, smoking the same amount of cannabis is not common. This lower 
consumption rate, however, is outweighed by a higher concentration of dangerous 
ingredients. 
31 See for example: Joy Janet Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Base 
(National Academy Press, Washington D.C., l 999). 
32 Peter Cohen and Hendrien Kaai The Irrelevance of Drug Policy: Patterns and Careers of 
experienced cannabis uses in populations of Amsterdam, San Francisco, and Bremen (CEDRO, 
Amsterdam, 2001) 75. 
33 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 15-19. 
34 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 15-19. 
35 <http//:www.thegooddrugsguide.com> (last accessed 20.07.05). 
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After all, the negative effects of heavy consumption, abuse and smoking 
cannabis lead to costs for society. If one has a look at the costs created by the 
treatment of smoking related disease and at those created by the treatment of 
alcohol addicts ( detoxication, rehabilitation and so on) one can assume that the 
costs related to cannabis abuse might be of a comparable level. Sellers would have 
no incentives to address these costs in a free cannabis market. 
- productivity loss -
Another extemality often mentioned in relation to cannabis, and alcohol as 
well, is decreased productivity of the consumers for society. It is said that 
cannabis can cause listlessness and behavioural changes that might lead to 
problems in schools and workplaces. There are no reliable and definitive research 
results showing the total costs for society. It seems that the figures are not as high 
as they are for alcohol. Alcohol is proven to cause serious problems in social 
groups like families, schools, and workplaces.36 However, cannabis and alcohol 
do not target a totally congruent consumer group. Whereas alcohol is consumed in 
all age levels, cannabis is more a youth drug, although some older people also 
consume it.37 Additionally, most cannabis consumers reduce their consumption or 
even stop to consume when they grew older.38 In contrast, alcohol users tend to 
keep their drinking behaviour or even extend it. 39 Alcoholism often leads to 
unemployment or non-productive time, because of alcohol related diseases. 
Problem drinkers tend to neglect their children or wives /husbands. 40 This can 
lead to behaviour and school problems of their children, for example. Although, 
cannabis might be responsible for productivity decrease of young people as well, 
it is not likely to lead to unemployment or family problems comparable to the 
serious ones caused by alcohol. 
36 WHO, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Global Status Report on Alcohol 
2004" above n 7, 59. 
37 Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare "The 2004 National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey" above n 11 , 17, 25 . 
38 Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare "The 2004 National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey" above n 11 , 25. 
39 Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare "The 2004National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey" above n I I, 17. 
40 WHO, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Global Status Report on Alcohol 
2004" above 7, 60 . 
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Ultimately, a free cannabis market creates externalities. Health hazards 
and less productivity shift costs to third parties. The lower productivity is not the 
decisive factor and would certainly not justify intervention. The question is 
whether the health care costs are of such a quality that they justify intervention. 
Considering the comparable dangerousness of cigarettes and, additional, the 
expected long term health hazards by over consumption, the health costs for 
society are likely to be enormous. Furthermore, society achieves no ex ante or ex 
post compensation for these costs. 41 There are no positive externalities to balance 
them. Besides, it is not expected that the free market itself would implement 
features to address these externalities. 
c -Information asymmetries-
Another form of market failure is the existence of information 
asymmetries. One of the main assumptions in regard to allocative efficiency is 
that the market participants have adequate information about the product, possible 
decisions and their consequences. 42 Only if this is the case are the individual 
preferences correctly reflected in the transaction. In this regard a free cannabis 
market and a free alcohol market face the same problems. 
In a free cannabis market sellers could advertise and in this way provide 
information about the product. Purchasers would have the opportunity for 
comparison shopping and word of mouth advertising would spread information. 
Besides, prices would serve as information carriers. Then again, it is unlikely that 
in a free market the sellers would point to the negative health effects. Moreover, it 
would be preferable for them to hide the possible health hazards. However, 
because of the more liberal environment there would be the possibility for a more 
open discussion about cannabis and its effects. This is likely to improve the 
knowledge about cannabis is general. 
In a totally free alcohol market, consumers would have generally more 
information about alcohol and its effects. This is, among other things, because 
alcohol is traditionally intimately connected with the western culture. But, to what 
41 Ogus, above n 15 , 36. 
42 Ogus, above n 15, 38, 39. 
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extent people really would be aware of the health hazards connected with alcohol 
and whether they would have information about the particular commodity is 
questionable. Although it is desirable for sellers to describe and advertise their 
products, they have no incentive to point out dangerous ingredients or effects of 
the particular product, for example the ingredients of Absinth or the effect of 
Alcopops. Nevertheless, there are no information duties implemented in the 
present regulated alcohol market. Interestingly, the situation seems to be different 
in regard to tobacco. There labelling duties concerning the possible negative 
effects of smoking tobacco are implemented in the market place. 
Given that a joint contains even higher concentrations of carcinogenic 
ingredients and cannabis consumers might be not aware of the possible negative 
health effects, information asymmetries exist. It is not likely that the principles of 
the free market would correct this market failure itself. Although not every 
information asymmetry would justify an intervention, because perfect information 
does not exist in real world transactions, the lack of information about serious 
health effects justifies intervention. 43 
B Paternalistic Concerns 
1 Paternalism 
Policy makers also have to consider paternalistic concerns. 
Behaviour of people is difficult to predict and it is often not as theories 
want it to be. People often underestimate the possibility to experience negative 
events such as accidents or serious illness. This bounded rationality concept 
questions the idea of a rational and fully informed consumer who only enters into 
a contract if this is welfare enhancing for them.44 Furthermore, people often suffer 
from bounded willpower.45 They take actions they know to be in conflict with 
43 Ogus, above n 15 , 38. 
44 
C.Jolls, C.R. Sunstein and R.Thaler "A Behavioural Approach to Law and economics" ( 1998) 
50 Stanford Law Review 1471 , 1477. 
4-
) Jail , Sunstein and Thaler, above n 44, 1479. 
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their own long term interests. Such "behavioural anomalies" might call for 
paternalistic intervention. 
In simple terms paternalism means that preferences and choices of 
individuals are overridden by the decisions of society.46 Paternalistic intervention 
could be justified by reasons of welfare, good, happiness, needs, interest or values 
of the particular individual being affected. However, paternalism considerations 
clash with the basic assumption of a free and voluntary market in which 
individual preferences are the decisive factor. Consequently, they are 
controversial. The most extreme positions are "soft" and "hard paternalism". 
Whereas "soft paternalism" allows an intervention only if the choice in question is 
not voluntary and has harmful effects, "hard paternalism" allows intervention 
even if the particular choice is voluntary.47 
There are other views that paternalism is justified in regard to negative 
temptations which are difficult to resist by individuals, for example alcohol and 
drug consumption.48The supporters of this view state that individuals would prefer 
to delegate choices in such situations, and therefore utility would be maximised if 
the individuals consent in advance to being deprived of the temptation. 49 This 
view assumes therefore that the decisive individual preference is the delegation. 
The problem is that such preferences can only be assumed. And, the present 
debate in regard to a change in the cannabis policy in particular makes it obvious 
that many individuals do not prefer the superior decisions of the policy makers. 
They would prefer to consume cannabis even if this could have negative health 
effects for them. Another view even surrenders the assumption that individual 
preferences are superior. 50 This is criticised as renunciation of basic rights of 
freedom and authoritarianism. 51 
Ogus states: "paternalist regulation, therefore, has to proceed by applying 
uniform control on certain activities where it is assumed that many individuals 
46 Trebilcock, above 14 ,149. 
47 Trebilcock above n 14, 149. 
48 Ogus, above n 15 , 52. 
49 Ogus, above n 15 , 52 . 
50 Ogus above n 15, 53. 
51 Ogus above n 15 , 53. 
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make unwise decisions". 52 In regard to the possible negative health effect for 
cannabis consumers it is said that negative effects of consumption in moderation 
are not proven. Only the health hazard of abuse, over consumption and smoking 
are for certain. Many decisions in life are unwise in some views. Many 
commodities are unhealthy if consumed in excess, as seen by alcohol and tobacco. 
But nobody, for example, would regulate the cake market only because some 
individuals have fatty livers or overweight. Why should it then be justified to 
override individual preferences for cannabis consumption? In contrast to the cake 
example, cannabis is nevertheless an addictive drug, and drugs have an 
exceptional position in contrast to other normal commodities. In the case of 
cannabis consumption, there are serious health effects in question and only if 
consumers have enough information to fully estimate these effects and are able to 
adjust decisions to these estimations on a voluntary basis, can their choices be said 
to reflect their real preferences. 
53 Considering this matter two consumer groups 
might prompt to paternalistic concerns: Addicts and young people. 
2 Addiction 
Voluntary choices might be prevented by possible addiction. 
54 Addicts do 
not act reasonable in regard to their drug. Their decisions do not reflect the choice 
they would have preferred if they were not addicted. In contrast to hard drugs, 
cannabis is not highly addictive; nevertheless 9% of the users became addicted.
55 
Having regard to the annual prevalence of cannabis abuse of the population in 
different countries it is obvious that the number of addicts might be big (see Fig. 
12). For example, given that in 2004 13, 9 % of the population of Australia 
consumes cannabis and 9% of them became addicted, this would lead to 
approximately 1,3 % cannabis addicts in Australia. Concerning this number, the 
addict problem justifies intervention. 
Dependence is also a big problem in relation to alcohol and there 
paternalistic intervention is acknowledged. For instance, according to WHO, in 
52 Ogus, above n 15 , 53 . 
53 Trebilcock, above n 14, 151. 
54 Trebilcock above n 14, 149; The Economist "Stumbling in the Dark" 
(26 July 200 I) The Economist < http ://www.economist.com> (last accessed O 1. 10.2005). 
55 Janet Joy above n 31, 95. 
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2002 7.7% of the adults in the USA, and in 2000 3.8% of the adults in Germany 
were dependent on alcohol. 56 
3 Young people 
Another argument which might lead to paternalistic concerns is the 
rationality issue. Some consumer groups might underestimate the risks of the 
long term effects of consuming cannabis. The age range of cannabis consumers in 
the USA shows that the main consumers in 2000-2004 were young people (see 
Fig.13 ). This figure is representative for most other countries. 57 The question is 
whether young people are able to fully estimate the effects of cannabis 
consumption, and even if they do so, whether they adjust their choices to that 
estimation. A comparable situation exists for alcohol. Surveys, undertaken by the 
WHO, show that the amount of alcohol misbehaviour and binge drinking has risen 
in the last few years.58 In New Zealand for example, about 20% of all 14 to 17 
year olds are drinkers, and 48% of all 14to 17 year olds engage in regular binge 
drinking.59 Most young people consume alcohol at parties together with others. 
Some of them only drink to get drunk60 and it is more than questionable whether 
14 to 17 year olds are able to conceive all the dangers connected with alcohol 
misbehaviour. For most young people alcohol as well as cannabis is a party and 
relaxing drug. They use it together with others to have fun and to be "cool". This 
might be a result of too little information or a casual approach. Young people tend 
to discount future risks. There might be young people who might recognise the 
dangers, but who want to be accepted by a particular group and therefore consume 
because of peer pressure. As a result the choices of this consumer group are not 
fully voluntary. As protection of the weak, particularly youth protection, is one of 
the tasks for a policy maker, interventions is justified in a free cannabis market for 
paternalistic reasons. 
56 WHO, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse ,,Global Status Report on Alcohol 
2004" above n 7, 30. 
57 Susanne Borchers- Tempel and Birgitta Kolte "Cannabis consumption in Amsterdam, Bremen 
and San Francisco: A three city comparison of long term cannabis consumption" (2002) Journal of 
Drug Issues < http://www2.criminology.fsu .edu> (last accessed 01.10.2005). 
58 WHO, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse ,,Global Status Report on Alcohol 
2004" , above n 7, 31. 
59 NZ Committee of Inquiry " Inquiry: Should alcopops be taxed higher than other alcoholic 
beverages to reduce teenage drinking? ", I <http :// www.myd .govt.nz>. 
60 WHO, Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse ,,Global Status Report on Alcohol 
2004", above 7, 32 . 
In summary, possible addiction and the problem of consumption by young 
people create paternalistic concerns and justify intervention in a free cannabis 
market. It is not expected that a free cannabis market would implement protection 
features in the market place in the absence of governmental intervention. 
C Ethical Concerns 
Responsible policy concerning drugs also calls for ethical considerations. 
There are different strict conservative views, which prefer to forbid drugs for 
different reasons6 1. Some conservatives state that cannabis consumption would 
lead to an elusory escape of reality. Others consider cannabis as immoral, because 
it is illegal.62 This kind of moralistically conservative view fights against a free 
market or regulation. 
In contrast to that, there are the libertarians who call for a drug policy that 
respects the individual freedom to perform the own preferences.
63 However, also 
this group is divided in strict liberals and others who recognise that a total free 
market creates problems64 • Both, conservatives and liberals have different starting 
points to approach the cannabis issue, and it is not possible to satisfy both groups 
at the same time. 
The same situation is given with several religious groups. On the one hand, 
there are strict Christian groups that state that humankind is the image of God and 
that it is therefore not allowed to use drugs at all. 65 On the other hand, there are 
groups that call for free cannabis, because they claim to need it for religious 
experiences.66 Both groups have supporters and adversaries. If one group is better 
off, the other is worse off and vice versa. None of the approaches can provide a 
perfect solution in this regard. 
6 1 Mark Thornton " Do economics reach a conclusion" (2004) I Econ Journal Watch, 82,91, 94. 
62 The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley MP "Common Sense on Cannabis: The Conservative Case for 
Change"(July 200 I, The Social Market Foundation London), 8. 
63 BBC News ,,The drugs debate"<http://news.bbc .co.uk> (last accessed O I. I 0 .2005). 
64 Mark Thornton " Do economics reach a conclusion" (2004) I Econ Journal Watch, 82, 88-105 . 
65 By Rev . Dale A. Robbins, D.Min." Drugs & the Christian" <http: //www.ukcia.org> (last 
accessed O 1.10.2005) . 
66 Kyle Littman "New Religious Movements" (May 200 I, University of Virginia, USA) 
<http: //www.religiousmovements.lib.virginia.edu>(last accessed O 1.10.2005). 
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One main group fighting against cannabis are "parent interest groups", 
which fear for their children. 67 This group fights against a free market and 
regulation. One of the most stated concerns is that a government that "allows" 
cannabis would send wrong signals to young people. 68 Turning away from 
prohibition would deny the dangers not only of cannabis, but also of the ones of 
harder drugs. However, there are counterstatements that prohibition obviously 
would not work, and that a responsible cannabis approach would acknowledge 
that fact and use regulatory tools to overcome the problems. Another argument by 
parent groups is the suspected character of cannabis as a "gateway" for hard 
drugs. Young people would lose their resentments concerning them. However, 
there are also counter researches suggesting that the character as a "gateway" is 
mainly caused either by personal nature of the consumer or by the present legal 
status of cannabis.69 
Although all these arguments need to be considered, it is not possible that 
a political approach satisfies all interests. Some of the demands are contrary and 
can not be satisfied at the same time. Others are extreme and do not reflect public 
opinion. However, a free market of cannabis without any regulatory tool would 
classify cannabis as a normal commodity, even more harmless than alcohol and 
cigarettes. Cannabis is a drug and should be treated as such, therefore ethical 
concerns argue against a total free market. 
D Further Points to Consider 
In theory lower prices, convenient availability, and the diminished social 
stigma in a free market would encourage consumers to consume. 70 A higher 
consumption leads to an increase of the consumption related costs, which includes 
possible externalities, and intensifies the paternalistic concerns. 
67 BBC News ,, Call to legalise cannabis rejected"<http:// news.bbc.co .uk> (last accessed 
01.10.2005); see for example: <http://parent.aadc.com> (last accessed O 1.10.2005). 
68 Gareth Griffith and Rebekah Jenkin ,,Cannabis : The Contemporary Debate" Background paper 
1994/1 , New South Wales Parliament, 2. 
69 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 22. 
70The Economist " Set it free! " (28 July 200 I) The Economist < http: //www.economist.com> (last 
accessed O 1. 10.2005) ; Mert Daryal Prices, Legalisation and Marijuana Consumption (Economic 
Research Centre, Department of Economics, University of Western Australia, 1999), 20 
<http://www.ecom.uwa. edu.au> (last accessed 01 .10.2005). 
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One advantage of a free market is that the current black market would 
vanish, and as result its related costs. This would lead to a clear isolation of the 
cannabis market from the market for other drugs, which might diminish a possible 
effect of cannabis as a gateway drug. Cannabis consumers would not have the 
status as criminals and there would not be the stigma of delinquency any more. 
A free market would provide for legal remedies related to contract law, 
business law and the like. Transaction costs, information costs and price would be 
lower. 
In addition, one has also to take into account that a free market would 
require a political change not only for the UN, but also for the member states. 
Although the main focus would be on abolishing the present prohibition statutes, 
the UN would have to spend money, time, and manpower to change its 
conventions and so would have the member states. However, if we assume free 
cannabis markets, law enforcement costs for special cannabis law would not exist. 
Costs for breach of contracts or fraud, would not be higher than the one caused by 
the exchange of other "normal" commodities. 
In essence, in a free market the market participants would be better off. 
Seller and purchaser would regulate the market outcomes with their demand and 
supply. They could enter in contracts if they think it is preferable for them to do 
so. On the other hand, society and the tax payers as third party in particular, would 
be worse off to the extent that the public health system bears the costs. 
E Summary 
Although the free market would have many advantages for the market 
participants, it creates failures in shape of externalities and information 
asymmetries. They are of such a quality that they justify intervention. Also 
paternalistic and ethical concerns call for this result. It is not expected that a free 
market would address the externalities or the paternalistic goals concerns. The 
goal for a responsible cannabis policy should therefore be to address effectively 
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the outlined concerns. To identify which approach is most effective in doing so, 
the market outcomes of them are to be measured against the desired policy goals. 
IV THE CURRENT POLICIES AND THE BLACK MARKET 
This section starts with prohibition in general and goes on to examine the 
compliance of the different prohibition approaches with the outlined goals. 
At present, the western countries apply more or less strict prohibition 
approaches consistent with the Single Convention. However, approaches range 
from total prohibition, total prohibition with expediency principle, and prohibition 
with civil penalties to partial prohibition. The problem with prohibition in general 
is that it does not mean that there is no market at all. There is a demand for 
cannabis and, therefore, always someone will supply it. Because of that, 
prohibition crates a black market. According to the United Nations, such a market 
exists in 96% of the countries and no country has ever been able to eliminate it. 71 
The US government had similar experiences when it implemented "The 
Prohibition" into the alcohol market in 1920. Its purpose was to reduce crime and 
corruption, to solve social problems, to reduce the tax burden created by prisons 
and poorhouses, and improve health and hygiene in America. Nevertheless, as 
Fig.13 demonstrates, this approach was not as effective as politicians thought it 
were. While consumption decreased at the beginning, the consumers shifted to 
substitutes such as drugs, for instance morphine and, after a while, consumption 
of alcohol increased again.72 Moreover, crime rates, and in particular gang wars 
and corruption were increased. Additionally, the government lost an important 
source of revenue. This approach did not achieve the desired goals at all and, 
therefore, The Prohibition was set aside in 1933. 
71 UODOC World Drug Report 2005, above n 4, 27. 
72 Mark Thornton,, Policy Analysis- alcohol prohibition was a failure"<http: //www.cato.org>. 
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A Prohibition and its Impact on Consumption 
The theoretical goal of prohibition is to eliminate consumption. The 
question is how effective is it in practice. There are two theoretical effects of 
prohibition on the consumption range. One theory states that prohibition in 
particular would attract consumers and therefore encourages them to consume.
73 
Young people, for example, would consume cannabis only in order to rebel 
against authorities. Without the "prohibition as label", cannabis would lose its 
attractiveness. On the other hand, there are opinions that the fear of punishment 
and the respect for the law would minimise consumption.
74 Which theory has the 
most practical effect is not entirely proved. However, it is likely that prohibition 
really has an effect on demand and on supply. First, it raises the costs for 
suppliers, because there are additional dangers and discomfort.
75 As a result, the 
supply curve shifts upwards. Second, there are also additional costs for the 
customers, for example fear for legal penalties, violence and crime connected with 
the black market transaction and uncertainty about product quality. 
76 Thus, the 
demand side is also likely to be shifted downwards. In consequence, this leads to a 
reduction in consumption.77 The social stigma and the required additional effort to 
purchase cannabis might have a further consumption reducing effect. Although 
the public opinion about cannabis is changing, it is likely that also the respect of 
the present prohibition law contributes to a consumption reduce. 
There are no figures, which prove the amount consumption would 
decrease. However, theory and practice are two different things. The present high 
consumption rate indicates that prohibition generally is not as effective in 
decreasing consumption, as many supporters want it to be (see Figs. 1, 3 and 12). 
On the other hand, there are no statistics about the consumption rate in a free 
market, which could help to reconstruct the development. However, because this 
73 
Jeffrey Miron and Jeffrey Zwiebel "The Economic Case Against Drug Prohibition"( 1995) 9 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 175, 176. ; see also for total prohibition: Jonathan P. Caulkins 
"Zero-Tolerance Policies: Do They Inhibit or Stimulate Illicit drug Consumption?" ( 1993) 39 
Management Science 458,473. 
74 Miron and Zwiebel , above n 73 , 177. 
75 Miron and Zwiebel , above n 73 , 176. 
76 Miron and Zwiebel , above n 73 , 176. 
77 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 57. 
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1s not the place to solve the theoretical conflict, this paper assumes that 
prohibition has a consumption reducing effect. 
B Costs Created by a Black Market 
There are "black market failures" in the shape of information asymmetries 
and externalities. First, the information asymmetries are intensified. It is to 
distinguish between information about possible health hazards and product 
information, for example ingredients, quality and the like. 
Whereas buyers in a free market probably would have only a little 
information about the negative health effects of cannabis, they would have even 
less information about that fact in a black market. It is even more unlikely that 
black market seller would point to possible health hazards, then that sellers in a 
free market would do so. Further, in such a market the customer has hardly any 
information about the product quality. There is no way for the consumer to 
receive the necessary information, if the seller does not want him to have more 
information about the product. The possibility to shop around is minimised and it 
is easy for a seller to hide price changes by lowering product quality. Therefore, 
the information asymmetries are worse than they would be in a free cannabis 
market. This causes high information costs and the information asymmetries lead 
to a market failure. A black market does not correct these market failures and its 
character does not allow implementing special protection features by the 
government. 
A second failure exists in shape of additional externalities. First, there are 
still health care costs, because the black market supplies cannabis and makes 
cannabis consumption to some extent possible. 78 Furthermore, there is an 
increased crime rate in relation to black markets. Because seller and customer are 
not able to rely on legal protection, they have to find different ways to protect 
their rights. This leads to violence, corruption and crime and thus to additional 
costs for society. In addition, the law enforcement costs rise in a black market. 
78 UNO DC, "World Drug Report 2005", above n 4, 374,376 
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The black market intensifies, further, the paternalistic concerns for 
implementing prohibition, because it enables youngsters as well as addicts to 
purchase cannabis. 
C Summary 
In conclusion, measured against the desired policy goals it seems that 
prohibition intensifies the market failures of the free market. The created black 
market contradicts the goals of prohibition. It enables in particular young people 
and addicts to purchase their drug and creates further externalities. With the 
assumed consumption reducing effect, however, it achieves at least a reduction of 
the consumption related costs. 
As the current prohibition approaches to cannabis vary in their strictness, 
their impact on the black market and the effects are also different. 
V THE CURRENT APPROACHES 
A Total Prohibition without Any Expediency Principle 
Total prohibition without any expediency principle is the strictest approach 
in relation to cannabis consumption.79 It is also the most discussed one. According 
to this approach cultivation, import, sale, possession, distribution and use of any 
amount of cannabis are totally prohibited. Total prohibition operates in most US 
states, Sweden, France, England and Wales, although in England and France, 
alternatives to prosecution, such as cautions or referral, are possible. 
80 
Nevertheless, in the USA for example, 25 million people aged over 12 consumed 
cannabis in 2003.81 Also, England and France are among the countries with the 
highest cannabis consumption rate in the world (see Figs. 12 and 15
82
) . 
79 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 57 . 
80 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12 , 58 . 
81 US Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Centre, National Drug Threat Assessment 
2005 Summary Report, Fig. 8 <www.usdoj.gov> (last accessed O 1.10.2005) 
82 Both figures show different percentages, because they use different measuring methods . 
Nevertheless, their resulted ranking of the countries is nearly the identical. 
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1 Does it address the failures of a free market? 
The first step is to determine whether this approach meets the failures of a 
free cannabis market: externalities and information asymmetries. 
Whether prohibition effectively meets the health care costs shifted to 
society is questionable. Because total prohibition assumes no consumption and no 
market at all , it provides no features to particularly address health issues. Health 
care costs, however, are reduced as result of the assumed consumption reducing 
effect of prohibition. Nevertheless, the consumption rates under total prohibition 
are still high and as a result so are the health care costs for society (see Figs.3, 11 
and 12). Consequently, it cannot be said that total prohibition is effective in 
addressing health care costs. 
Besides, total prohibition is also unlikely to meet the information 
asymmetries caused by a free market. The aim of prohibition is to undermine 
every kind of trade and consumption, therefore this approach itself has naturally 
no information supply features in the market place. Moreover, as outlined above, 
the information asymmetries are even intensified, because of the black market. 
2 Does it address the paternalistic concerns? 
It 1s questionable whether paternalistic considerations concernmg 
voluntary choices call for a total prohibition. As outlined above, the main 
consumers of cannabis are young people and the numbers of consumers even 
under a total prohibition approach is high. Young people are not able to fully 
estimate the negative effects in depth or to adjust their decisions to this estimation. 
In a theoretically perfect total prohibition approach, young people would not 
consume cannabis any more, but the black market still allows them to purchase 
and consume cannabis. Nevertheless, their number is likely to be smaller than it 
would be in a total free market. 
The problem with addicts who might misjudge the trade off between 
pleasure and negative effects also exists in a total prohibition approach. Addicts 
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are not able to choose voluntarily any more, therefore they are likely to consume 
even under a total prohibition. Although in theory total prohibition is able to 
address this problem, because without consumption there would be no addiction, 
this does not work in practice. The black market provides for the possibility to 
purchase and consume. Whether there might be fewer addicts in a total 
prohibition approach as in a free market is not proved. However, because the 
consumption generally might decrease, it is likely that also the number of addicts 
might decrease. However, the present high consumption level in the total 
prohibition countries leads to the effect that there are still addicts and that 
therefore the effectiveness of a total prohibition is questionable. 
3 Ethical concerns 
As total prohibition is on the strictest end of the intervention scale, it 
would satisfy the ethical concerns of conservatives, parents groups and Christian 
groups. However, liberalists, some religious groups and medical cannabis 
supporters would be worse off. 
4 Further points to consider 
One disadvantages of a total prohibition approach is the creation of a black 
market system. Such a market contradicts the theoretical effects of a total 
prohibition. To fight the black market and its effects causes additional costs. 
There are costs of law enforcement, as well as for information and education 
campaigns. 
Furthermore, as outlined above, total prohibition faces acceptance and 
compliance problems. As it is the most extreme prohibition approach, it seems not 
to keep pace with changed public opinion. The ineffective enforcement 
contributes to the fact that young people undermine the law. 
Aside from these negative effects of the total prohibition approach, one 
should bear in mind that it is at least likely to decrease the health care cost, youth 
consumption and addiction by reducing consumption in general. 
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From an economic point of view, there are providers and consumers that 
are worse off, because they would prefer to purchase in a free market. 
Furthermore, there are further costs shifted to third parties, created by the black 
market. Taxpayers have to pay these costs and are therefore worse off too. 
B Total Prohibition with Expediency Principle 
Another current intervention type is total prohibition with expediency 
principl. 83 This means that generally cultivation, trade, purchases and 
consumption is prohibited, but with exceptions. This kind of intervention, for 
example, is used in the Netherlands. 84 Although there, cultivation, trade and 
possession of cannabis are still prohibited, the sale and purchase of small amounts 
through a system of registered coffee-shops is an exception.85 Such coffee-shops 
are tolerated provided they sell no hard drugs, do not sell to under 18s, create no 
public nuisance, have no more then 500 grams of cannabis on the premises and 
sell no more than 5 grams at a time. 86 If owners or operators of coffee shops break 
these rules, they will face administrative procedures, criminal prosecution or 
both. 87 
1 Does it address the failures of the free market? 
The question is whether this approach is able to meet the failures of a free 
market. Information asymmetries are likely to be less then in a total prohibition 
approach without expediency principle. There are, nevertheless, asymmetries that 
are comparable to the ones in the free market. One has to distinguish between the 
market in which the end-consumer operates and the market in which the coffee-
shops purchase. If end-consumers buy in coffee-shops, they probably receive 
information about the quality of the particular cannabis product, because the seller 
wants to describe and praise its product. Furthermore, the end-consumers is able 
83 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 58 . 
84 Ministry of Health Drug Policy in the Netherlands - Basic Principles and Enforcement in 
Practice (International Publication Series Health, Welfare and Sports, No 18 September 2003), 3. 
85 Ministry of Health Drug Policy in the Netherlands, above n 79, 9. 
86 The Economist " Better Ways : If enforcement doesn ' t work, what are the alternati ves?·'(26 July 
28 200 I) The Economist< http ://www.economist.com> (last accessed O 1.10.2005). 
87 Ministry of Health Drug Policy in the Netherlands, above n 89, 19. 
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to comparison shop and, therefore, to compare the commodity. Then again, sellers 
probably do not point to the possible negative health effects of cannabis 
consumption, because this would endanger their trade. Therefore, information 
asymmetries, at least concerning the negative effects, still remain. In contrast to 
end-consumers, the coffee-shops still have to purchase their cannabis on the black 
market. In this relationship, information asymmetries might exist too. These 
asymmetries might later be unintentionally passed to the end-consumer by the 
coffee shops. In conclusion, this approach is not able fully to correct the 
information asymmetries of a free market. 
Another question 1s whether this approach addresses the outlined 
externalities in terms of health care costs. The consumption rate of cannabis in the 
Netherlands is average in Europe (see for example Figs. 4 and 12). Therefore, the 
Netherlands government itself concludes that the coffee-shops do not encourage 
the consumption. 88 In comparison to a free market, it is likely that nearly the same 
number of consumers would consume, because in consequence nearly everyone 
has the possibility to consume. Therefore, it is likely that the level of health care 
costs would be comparable high in both regulatory systems. 
Furthermore, by concentrating the cannabis market on special spots, the 
"coffee shop market" creates additional externalities in shape of falling prices for 
nearby property. 89 
2 Does it address the paternalistic concerns? 
Having regard to paternalism considerations, one has to acknowledge that 
the problem with involuntary choices of addicts remains in such an approach. 
They have the unrestrained ability to purchase their cannabis in coffee-shops. 
Because consumption is nearly unmodified, the numbers of addicts is also the 
same as in a free market. 
88 Hoogervorst, Donner and Remkes ,,Policy on Cannabis" (Parliamentary Document, 2004),3. 
89 BBC News "Decriminalisation: Let's go Dutch?" <http://news.bbc.co.uk> (last accessed 
01.10.2005). 
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However, this approach addresses the youth protection concerns with 
under 18 restrictions. This would in theory lead to no consumption by young 
people, but in practice, they use the black market to purchase cannabis. In 
comparison to a free market on the other hand, it is likely that the number of 
consuming young people has decreased under prohibition with expediency 
principle. As outlined above prohibition imposes additional costs on buyers. As 
this approach is still prohibition, there might be people deterred and might refuse 
to consume because of respect of that law. Nevertheless, the problem with some 
young people who underestimate the negative effects or consume only because of 
peer pressure still exists. In conclusion, this approach does not fully achieve the 
paternalistic goals. 
3 Ethical concerns 
To what extent this approach addresses the ethical concerns is 
questionable. It is theoretically prohibition, but it results in practice in a nearly 
unrestricted possibility for adults to purchase and consume cannabis. In 
consequence, conservatives are worse off. In addition, liberals are worse off, 
because this approach is still prohibition. However, parents might be better off, 
because young people are, at least theoretically, prohibited to purchase cannabis. 
Medical cannabis supporters, on the other hand, are partly better off due to the 
possibility for adults to purchase cannabis. 
4 Further points to consider 
One of the major advantages of this approach is that it is able to diminish 
the black market activity and changes the purchasing environment for the end-
consumers. The costs; normally connected with such a black market, are 
minimised. Buyers of small quantities do not have to fear punishment and social 
stigma any more. Moreover, they can now rely on legal protection to enforce their 
rights. By separating the cannabis market from the market for hard drugs, the 
possible character of cannabis as a gateway drug is weakened. On the other hand, 
coffee-shops still operate in a black market system, because they have to purchase 
illegally ("back-door-problem"). They have no possibility to rely on legal 
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remedies. 90 In this context, there is still violence, corruption and crime together 
with high law enforcement costs. The light of contradiction makes this approach 
controversial.91 It seems, nevertheless, that this approach is more in line withthe 
public opinion than the stricter prohibition approaches. It provides a clear 
distinction between cannabis and hard drugs without denying the dangers of 
cannabis. 
However, this approach might cause further problems for society: drug 
touri sm and smuggling. 92 The drug tourists are not ordinary tourist. Normally they 
just drive over the border pop in the next store, buy their cannabis and go back. 
On the other hand, there might be people attracted by the Netherlands as holiday 
destination, because of the liberal cannabis environment. This kind of tourist 
would spend money in the cities. Although "more people" does also mean more 
noise, nuisance and garbage, they would not be of a level to justify intervention. 
Although smuggling is more a problem for the neighbouring states, it is 
likely to intensify the cannabis problem in the Netherlands too. Smuggles increase 
the demand for cannabis in the black market. This leads to intensified problems 
with crime, corruption and the like caused by the increased black market. 
Smugglers are especially attracted by the Netherlands, because of the whole 
"cannabis environment" is changed to purchase. To transport cannabis is easier. 
Moreover, the cannabis prices are lower, because of the lower transaction costs. 
Therefore, more smugglers are attracted by the Netherlands than by countries with 
a total prohibition approach. In a UN wide free market, there would be no reason 
for smuggling any more. 
From an economic point of view, seller and consumers may be better off, 
because they are able to trade in a "quasi licit market". On the other hand, there 
are still consumers who would prefer to buy more than the possible 5 grams or 
sellers that would prefer to be able to advertise, sign contracts, and borrow money 
90 The Economist " Better Ways: lf enforcement doesn ' t work, what are the alternatives?"(26 July 
28 200 I) The Economist< http ://www.economist.com> (last accessed O 1.10.2005) . 
91 The Economist " Better Ways: lfenforcement doesn't work, what are the alternatives?"(26 July 
28 200 I) The Economist< http://www.economist.com> (last accessed O 1.10.2005). 
92 BBC News " Decriminalisation: Let's go Dutch?" <http: //news.bbc.co.uk> (last accessed 
01.10.2005). 
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and so on. Therefore, there remam market participants who are worse off. 
Additionally, there are still externalities that make third parties worse off. 
C Prohibition with Civil Penalties 
A further approach to the cannabis issue is prohibition with civil penalties 
for minor offences. 93 In such a system, everything in regard to cannabis is still 
prohibited, but the way in which the cannabis law is enforced is changed. Instead 
of criminal penalties, there would be civil penalties. However, anyone who denies 
guilt or does not pay the fine will still have to be prosecuted. Such system has 
been in place in Australia, for example.94 In 1987 South Australia and in 1992 the 
Australian Capital Territory introduced expiation notice schemes. Under these 
schemes, a person found committing a minor offence relating to cannabis is given 
what amounts to an "on-the-spot" notice. If the prescribed penalty is paid within 
the prescribed time then no court appearance is required and no conviction is 
entered. If the person receiving the expiation notice fails to respond to it, however, 
normal court processes follow. 
1 Does it address the failures of the free market? 
The question is whether the more liberal penalty approach leads to a 
consumption increase. If one has a look at the consumption range in Figs. 12 and 
15, one can see that Australia is among the countries with the highest 
consumption rate. 95 The US, England and Wales have comparable numbers of 
cannabis user, although they apply a total prohibition approach without 
expediency principle. 96 It seems therefore that prohibition with civil penalties has 
a similar effect on consumption, although the fear of civil penalties might not 
have the same deterrent effect as the one of criminal punishment. 
93 Drug Policy Forum Trust ,,Alternative Systems of Cannabis Control in New Zealand" 
(Discussion Paper, Wellington July 1997) 10. 
94 Drug Policy Forum Trust above n 93 , I 0. 
95 See also: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare"The 2004 National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey", above n 11 , 3. 
96 See also: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare "The 2004 National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey", above n 11 ,3. 
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Health care costs are also not drastically decreased in this approach, 
because people sill consume. They might be lower than in a free market, because, 
as outlined above, a free market might lead to a consumption increase. Therefore, 
this approach meets partly the shifted costs to third parties. 
Information asymmetries remain. Prohibition with civil penalties is 
nevertheless prohibition and provides consequently no information about cannabis 
as commodity in the particular transaction or its possible negative effects. 
2 Does it address the paternalistic concerns? 
As the idea behind every prohibition is to prevent everything in regard to 
cannabis, this approach seems to be efficient in regard to paternalistic 
considerations, although it does not address them with particular features. 
However, almost one in five teenagers in Australia had used cannabis in the last 
12 months. 97 156,000 male teenagers and 141 ,200 female teenagers were recent 
marijuana/cannabis users. These numbers show that in Australia many young 
people still consume cannabis and it is likely that this is the same in other 
countries with a civil penalty approach. As outlined above, young people 
underestimate the dangers, or are influenced by peer pressure, so that their choices 
are not fully voluntary. A similar situation exists in relation to addicts. Because 
the number of cannabis users has not drastically decreased, the number of addicts 
also has not. Nevertheless, the number is less than in a free market approach. 
3 Ethical concerns 
This approach is met by similar ethical concerns as total prohibition 
without expediency principle. Conservatives, parents and Christian groups might 
be better off, because this approach is prohibition. Nevertheless, some members of 
these groups might be worse off because they would prefer criminal punishment. 
Liberals, some religious groups and medical cannabis supporters are worse off. 
97 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare "The 2004 National Drug Strategy Household 
Survey", above n 11 ,26. 
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4 Further points to consider 
The big disadvantage of this approach is, as by the other prohibition 
approaches as well, the creation of a black market and its additional costs for 
society. Changing only the type of law enforcement might have no effect on the 
black market allocation. However, the changed punishment influences the dealing 
environment. Purchasers as well as sellers might be more reasonable and not that 
associated to crime, because a civil penalty has another quality than a criminal 
penalty. It is likely that consumers are encouraged to consume, because the costs 
for purchasing cannabis are lower than in a total prohibition approach. On the 
other hand, it is unlikely that the consumption increase is as high as it would be in 
a total free market, because penalties are still possible. 
There is still a need for administrative staff, law making and enforcement, 
because the civil penalties also have to be enforced. In addition, if fines are not 
paid, the prosecution that follows in such a case may lead to even more costs in 
result. Furthermore, the problem of "net widening" exists, because offenders, 
which in another regime only received a warning, now are burdened with a fine. 98 
For example in 2003 to 2004, cannabis was responsible for 72 % of drug arrests in 
Australia. 99 Although the law enforcement costs might be lower than in a total 
prohibition without expediency principle, they are still high. 100 
To what extent this approach is the line of the public opinion is not clear. 
There is still the purchasing in the black market to circumvent the law. Cannabis, 
however, is forbidden even if not to the same level than hard drugs. It seems that 
this approach might be more with line of pubic opinion than total prohibition. 
Nevertheless it is controversial. 
From an economic point of view, low-level offenders might be better off, 
because they are no longer burdened with a criminal record. This is an advantage 
in comparison to the other prohibition approaches. In comparison to a free market 
98 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12, 62, 63. 
99 Australian Government, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare "Statistic of drug use in 
Australia 2004" above n 11 ,76,77 
100 Drug Policy Forum Trust above n 93, 11. 
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allocation, the consumers will be worse off, because they would prefer to 
purchase their cannabis without any burden. In addition, providers are worse off, 
because they are still forced to operate in a black market system. Furthermore, 
there are still the additional costs of the black market itself that affect third parties. 
D Partial Prohibition 
In partial prohibition systems cultivation, possession, and use up to a 
specified amount would be allowed for adults for personal use. 
101 Professional 
cultivation and sale for profit, however, would still be prohibited; therefore, there 
would still be no licit market system for cannabis. This approach are used for 
example in Spain and Alaska. 102 
1 Does it address the failures of a free market? 
Whether or not partial prohibition has an effect on health care costs for 
society is not clear. There are no research results concerning this matter. As this 
approach explicitly allows the personal cultivation and use for adults, it is not 
expected that the consumption level is lower than it would be in a free market. In 
such a system, the adult consumer has theoretically two ways to get his /her 
cannabis: by growing it by oneself or by purchasing it on the black market. 
However, because growing one ' s own cannabis is allowed, there is no need for 
costly purchasing for the adult user any more. Therefore, it is likely that the 
cannabis consumption rate by adults is the similar as it would be in a free market 
approach. Although there are no figures about how many consumers would grow 
their own cannabis, if one is too lazy or cannot grow one ' s own cannabis, it is still 
possible to purchase cannabis on the black market. Therefore, the consumption 
level by adults and the related health costs are likely to be similar as those in a 
free market. 
Conversely, underage consumers have still to purchase their cannabis in 
the black market. For them the situation is theoretically the same as under a total 
prohibition. In fact , it is expected that they also have an easier excess to cannabis. 
101 Drug Policy Forum Trust, above 93 , 11 . 
102 Report of the Health Committee, above n 12 , 63 ; Drug Policy Forum Trust above n 93 , 13 . 
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For example, what happens in a "two adult with one underage household" if the 
parents decide to grow their own cannabis? Who controls whether only the adults 
consume it? In summary, it is likely that the consumption is higher than it would 
be in a total prohibition, but not as high as in a total free market, because the 
prohibition for underage people might partly have effect. 
This approach is unlikely to address the information asymmetries. It is still 
a kind of prohibition, that it self provides no particular information features . If one 
grows one ' s own cannabis, one can be sure about the product quality, but in this 
case, cannabis is not part of a market exchange at all. Information asymmetries 
still exist to the extent to that adults and underage people, nevertheless, purchase 
on a black market. Therefore, this approach is unlikely to meet effectively all 
asymmetry problems. 
2 Does it address the paternalistic concerns? 
This approach is not able to address effectively the paternalistic concerns. 
Consumption and everything else concerning cannabis is prohibited for underage 
people. Nevertheless, many underage still consume cannabis, even if the number 
might be reduced. Therefore, the approach only partly meets the desired goal of 
youth protection. The same situation applies to addiction prevention. There might 
be fewer addicts, nevertheless there are some. As result, the approach meets only 
partly this goal as well. 
3 Ethical concerns 
The supporters of cannabis might partly be better off. Medical use and 
consumption are at least for adults who grow their own cannabis possible. 
However, liberals are still not fully satisfied. Conservatives, parents and Christian 
groups might criticize this approach too. 
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4 Further points to consider 
The question is to what extent partial prohibition influence the existence of 
a black market would. The decisive factor is how many users would in fact decide 
to grow their own cannabis or would supply cannabis to friends without profit. 
Using this approach in Alaska a black market remained. 103 However, it is 
questionable whether can be generalised. In Alaska the growing conditions for 
cannabis are generally bad, so that many consumer might have not been able to 
grow their own cannabis. 104 The consumption rates in Spain, for example, are also 
not helpful. Although the Figs.12 and 15 show that the consumption is at an 
average level in comparison to other countries, they do not show the origin of the 
cannabis, thus they cannot help to determine the black market activity. 
In Praxis, there is still demand by underage people and by adults who are 
not able or not willing to grow their own cannabis. Thus, someone will supply 
cannabis to him or her. Together with the black market, the related problems and 
externalities exist as well. It is, therefore, likely that a black market would still 
exist, even if to a reduced extend. 
To what extent costs for law enforcement are reduced is not proved. There 
1s still a cannabis law to enforce. This might be even more costly than total 
prohibition, because the law itself seems to be more complicated. It seems 
difficult in practice to establish whether adults only cultivate for their own 
consumption and whether they give "cannabis- gifts" to friends or whether they 
sell it. It is difficult to prevent young people from having access to homegrown 
cannabis. On the other hand, because of the fact that adults are allowed to 
consume and cultivate cannabis, the number of defenders might be lower. In 
consequence, law enforcement costs might be lower than in a total prohibition 
approach, but higher than in a free cannabis market. 
To what extent this approach is in line with public opinion is not clear. As 
it does not allow purchasing cannabis on a licit market, it still stigmatizes 
103 Drug Policy Forum Trust above n 93 , 13. 
104 Drug Policy Forum Trust above n 93 , 13 . 
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cannabis as dangerous. However, it distinguishes it from hard drugs by allowing, 
at least, growing one's own cannabis. 
From an economic point of view, there is still someone worse off. 
Consumers and sellers are still not able to purchase on a licit market. Even if 
adult-consumers are allowed to grow their own cannabis, some might prefer to 
buy cannabis. There are, in addition, still the externalities and costs caused by the 
black market allocation. 
E Summary 
Measured against the goals the prohibition approaches create different 
outcomes and are of different effectiveness. Although their ability to achieve the 
goals seems theoretically sufficient, the created black market and its costs 
contradict the theoretical advantages. However, as prohibition generally is 
assumed to have a consumption reducing effect, the approaches are at least able to 
influence the consumption related cost and problems. Theoretically, the most 
effective approach is total prohibition without any expediency principle. 
However, this approach creates the most serious problems connected with the 
black market. Prohibition with expediency principle and partial prohibition are 
more liberal and scale down the black market related costs. Also prohibition with 
civil penalties has some effect on the black market, because of the changed 
punishment approach. Prohibition theoretically addresses the ethical concerns of 
conservatives, Christians and parents. But in practise, the different kinds of 
prohibition are only insufficiently able to satisfy these concerns, because they 
allow consumption and/ or purchasing, and because all of them create a black 
market. Furthermore, in the changed public opinion the prohibition approaches 
seem to be more or less inconsistent. All of them require high enforcement costs, 
but, because they are in line with UN policy, no law changing cost. 
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VI REGULATION AS ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
A Theory and Praxis 
Regulation is the favoured kind of intervention of the adversaries of 
prohibition, though it has not been adopted in any industrialised country. In such a 
market, cannabis would be a normal commodity, similar to tobacco and alcohol. 
The supporters assume that a regulated cannabis market would have a competitive 
structure. Supply and demand would control the market outcomes. To address the 
failures of the "free market" and the other goals, it is possible to implement 
protection features by regulatory intervention. This approach is very flexible and 
many different regulatory tools are possible. In theory, the market participants 
would switch to such a regulated market, because their preferences would be met 
in a more efficient way. They would have the possibility to rely on legal 
protection and would face less information and transaction costs. The question is 
whether this theory would work in practice. As the approaches, outlined before, 
have shown there are often differences between regulatory theory and praxis. It is 
helpful to have a look to the alcohol market again. The regulatory features are 
more or less strict in the different countries. In Europe, for example, there is a 
North-South difference, whereby the northern countries apply stricter regulatory 
tools as the southern ones. 
B Cannabis and Alcohol - Do Regulatory Tools Address the Failures of a 
Free Cannabis Market? 
Because there are no figures and studies regarding the actual market 
outcomes of a regulated cannabis market, the following is just a theoretical 
analysis. Since the approach is flexible , it is, in contrast to the prohibition 
approaches, explicitly possible to implement several protection features to address 
externalities and paternalistic concerns. To outline possible features in detail, this 
paper sketches the most important regulatory features of the alcohol market. 
Researchers assume that cannabis consumption would increase in a purely 
free market. This outcome seems also reasonable for a regulated market, because 
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it is easier to purchase cannabis; costs are reduced on supply and on demand side 
and the social stigma would be vanished. A higher consumption level in general 
leads in consequence to higher health care costs shifted to society, more 
consumption by youth and addiction. The question is therefore what kinds of 
features are able to counter these outcomes. 
1 - Taxes-
First, an implementation of taxes would be possible. They are already 
implemented on alcohol and cigarettes as "sin taxes". Taxes are the most common 
regulatory feature for the alcohol markets in every country, while the level of the 
taxes vary. As a result of the taxes, prices of alcohol rise . This leads to a 
downwards sloping demand curve. 105 Even heavy and problem drinkers appear to 
be no exception to this rule. 106 Nevertheless, taxes need to be balanced carefully 
as otherwise a black market would be created again. This seems to be difficult in 
regard to cannabis, because of two reasons. First, the licit markets for alcohol and 
cigarettes have already existed before the taxes were implemented. One started 
with a low-level tax and than increased the levels. In case of cannabis, this would 
be different, because of the fact that together with the implementation of the licit 
market itself also the taxes have to be implemented. Second, as the prices for 
cannabis are already comparable low on the black market, taxes on cannabis 
generally must be " low". Thus, taxes should be on a level that does not prevent 
purchasers from shifting to the licit market. Whether it is reasonable to increase 
the taxes after a while is another question. 
In consequence the tax level in a cannabis market must be carefully 
balanced because of the characteristics of the implementation and because of the 
market value of the cannabis itself. Nevertheless, taxes are an attractive policy 
instrument. Not only can they influence the consumption level, but also they can 
be used to generate direct revenue and to balance the cannabis related costs. 
105 Frank Chaloupka, Michael Grossman and Henry Saffer "The Effect of Price on Alcohol 
Consumption and Alcohol- Relate Problems" (2002) 26 Alcohol Research and Health, 22,32; 
Gary Becker, Kevin Murphy and Micheal Grossman "The economic Theory of illegal Goods: the 
Case of Drugs" National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, 2004), 20. 
106 Alcohol and Public Policy Group Alcohol: No Ordinary Commodity. A summary of the book 
(Society for the study of Addiction to Alcohol and Other Drugs, 2003) 1343 , 1345. 
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Whether they work in practice is rather a question of practical design m the 
different countries than one of the theoretical approach. 
2 - Labelling duties and purity requirements -
Even if no yet used in the alcohol market, a second possible regulatory 
tool, would be the implementation of labelling duties and content requirements 
similar as in the cigarette market. An obligation to disclose possible negative 
health hazards might discourage some consumers to consume at all, or at least to 
reduce their consumption. This would help to reduce health costs. Such discloser 
duties also address information asymmetries, as they provide for information 
enabling consumers to make informed choices. Purity requirements that prohibit 
dangerous or addictive ingredients at all, or limit at least the level of them, would 
lead to less dangerous product quality and consequently to lower health costs. 
3 -Bans-
Another regulatory tool, also common in the alcohol market, is the 
implementation of alcohol bans for special times and areas. New Zealand and 
Australia, for instance, have implemented such bans. These bans address the 
paternalistic concerns in regard to consumption of young people. It is reasonable 
to ban alcohol as well as cannabis in areas where it, easily attracts young people 
for example at schools, playgrounds, sport events and so on. Therefore, some kind 
of cannabis-bans would be a suitable regulatory tool in a regulated market. 
4 -Licensing duties-
To encourage the reliability of manufacturers and providers the 
implementation of licensing duties is possible. Such duties contribute to guarantee 
information supply, purity requirements and compliance with law. The strictest 
form of supply regulation in this way is the monopoly-supply of alcohol by the 
government. In such a market only the state itself can officially provide for 
alcohol. This was the traditional approach in the Nordic countries of Europe. 
Recent political development has deregulated the alcohol market, although Russia 
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and Hungry, for example, still have governmental monopolies at all levels. 107 For 
cannabis, however, this would not work in practice. This strict kind of regulation 
would encourage private providers and would again lead to a black market 
distribution. In contrast, the requirements for licensing would work for cannabis 
manufactures and providers. This should be carefully designed. As cannabis is 
relatively easy to grow and to retail, too strict licensing duties might prompt the 
providers to switch to a black market system again. 
5 -Age restrictions-
Age restrictions are an important regulatory tool in the alcohol market. 
Every western country has implemented age restrictions. The decisive age varies 
from 16 to 21 years. In addition, the types of alcohol young people are allowed to 
purchase or to consume vary form country to country depending on the percentage 
of alcohol. The purpose of such restrictions is to prevent consumption by young 
people. In this regard, this tool would also be suitable for a cannabis market. The 
result, however, is more than questionable, as some young people circumvent the 
law and consume anyway. Furthermore, such restrictions do not only depend on 
consumer behaviour, also the suppliers have to comply with them. Effective law 
enforcement is needed so that the suppliers will comply. However, as age 
restrictions complicate to purchase cannabis by demanding more effort and 
creating fear of punishment, they are an effective tool. 
6 - Restrictions on advertising-
Quite recently, many countries have implemented restrictions on 
advertising alcohol. It is assumed that alcohol advertising portrays drinking as 
socially desirable, promotes pro-alcohol attitudes, of recruiting new drinkers and 
increases consumption among current drinkers. 108 However, the overall impact of 
advertising on alcohol consumption or alcohol-related harm may be limited and 
long-term effects are not proven jet. 109 Nevertheless, advertisements, especially 
107 Nina Rehn, above 28, 51. 
108 Nina Rehn, above n 28, 57. 
109 Nina Rehn, above n 28, 57. 
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m TV or cinema, are a medium to spread not only information, but also to 
transport life style stereotypes. This affects young people in particular. The same 
situation would be given in a regulated cannabis market. Therefore, it would be 
desirable and also suitable to implement advertising restrictions on cannabis. 
7 How to deal with addicts? 
The problem of possible dependence seems difficult to address, because 
becoming dependent or addicted has several causes, not all of which are 
attributable to the drug itself. There are no features that address these concerns in 
the alcohol market itself, whereas in the cigarette market labelling duties requiring 
warnings of possible dependence are common. Such labels would, at least, 
provide consumers with more information and enable them to make choices that 
are more informed. 
Nevertheless, this would not completely satisfy the paternalistic concerns, 
as paternalism assumes that the government acts on behalf of people that are not 
able to make the "right choices", which is the case in situation of addiction. It is 
difficult to identify addicts. There are not definitions or tests that could be used to 
identify addicts in daily market transactions. Therefore, something like "addict 
restrictions" comparable to age restrictions is not possible, neither for alcohol nor 
for cannabis. There are no considerable features that would address addict 
protection. 
C Some Tools Work! 
In the end, it is obvious that the alcohol issue is, at least to some extent, 
comparable to the cannabis issue. Some of the regulatory features already used for 
alcohol could also work for cannabis. The implementation of such tool requires a 
chase examination of the different tools and their effects. Another question is 
whether the market participants would try to circumvent the regulatory law. 
Although regulatory law also has a deterrent effect, it might not have a similar 
effect as it has in case of prohibition. Non-compliance would lead to punishment, 
but this would not have the same quality as under prohibition. This approach 
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seems to be more in line with public opinion, because it categorises cannabis as 
comparable to alcohol and tobacco. How consequent regulatory and enforcement 
bodies would deal with this approach cannot be anticipated. 
D Ethical Concerns 
The "label of prohibition" and together with it the stigma of cannabis as 
illicit drug would vanish. Conservatives, Christian groups and parents are worse 
off with such an approach, although the parental concerns could be addressed by 
age restrictions. In contrast, liberals, some religious groups and medical cannabis 
supporters would be better off. Nevertheless, some of them would prefer a total 
free market. 
E Further Points to Consider 
The biggest advantage of a regulated cannabis market is unquestionably its 
impact on the present black market allocation. A black market would have no 
reason to exist any more; 110 supply and demand could work in a licit basis. 
Therefore, the black market related costs for society would vanish. 
One has to bear in mind that the regulation laws also need enforcement 
and the regulatory law environment is likely to be extensive. In this regard, one 
could think about to using the same regulatory and enforcement bodies as already 
used for the alcohol and tobacco regulation. They already have experience with 
regulation, the different available regulatory tools and their effects. Nevertheless, 
additional men power and material is required, which cause additional costs. 
Additionally, the implementation of this approach reqmres not only a 
change in the laws of the UN, but also those of all member states. Already this 
causes costs for changing the law. These costs are even higher than by the free 
market approach. Whereas by implementing a free market approach the focus lies 
on elimination of special laws, by implementing regulation the focus is on the 
design of special regulatory law. Furthermore, a new approach would have a need 
for awareness training for both market participants and enforcement stuff. 
11 0 Miron and Zwiebel, above n 73, 189. 
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However, it is expected that these one off set-up costs would, over the years, be 
amortised by the saved expenses and the additionally possible tax revenue. 
For the market structure, this approach means that a licit market has to be 
created. This requires acceptance of this approach in the society and willingness 
of the market participants to switch to the new market. As this a new approach, 
there are many unknown variables. 
In a more liberal atmosphere, it might be easier to deal with the cannabis 
issue in a more informal ways, along with the political and the legal approaches. 
Because cannabis is not interloped into the underground any more, it might be 
easier to inform and to educate young children or to approach addicts. In addition, 
addicts might have more incentives to fight their addiction, as it would be easier 
for them to ask for help. 
From an economic point of view it seems possible to create as situation in 
which at least more sellers and buyers would be better off than in the prohibition 
approaches. Nevertheless, some consumer groups, for example young people or 
other market actors who would prefer to purchase in a total free market are worse 
off. However, because it is possible to implement regulatory tools that are more 
flexible concerning the desired goals, it seems that society, as a whole might be 
better off than in a prohibition or a free market approach. However, there are still 
externalities, and paternalistic and ethical concerns that are not fully erased by this 
approach. 
F Summary 
Regulation with its different regulatory tools is able to address directly the 
market failures and information asymmetries. This makes this approach flexible 
and theoretically effective. A black market and its related costs would not exist in 
case of carefully balanced regulatory tools. However, the assumed consumption 
increasing effect leads to more consumption related costs. Regulation fails to 
address the ethical concerns of conservatives and Christians. Parents might fight 
against regulation too, but age restrictions are able to address their concerns. As 
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today the opinion about cannabis is more liberal, regulation is more in the line of 
public opinion. However, law enforcement cost will exist, even if they might be 
lower as those in the prohibition approaches. Additionally, law-changing costs 
would arise to implement this approach. 
VII WHICH IS THE SUPERIOR APPROACH?-A COMPARISON 
- Consumption (see Table]) -
If one compares the ability of the different approaches to influence 
consumption, the prohibition approaches are generally more effective. They 
increase transaction costs by requiring further effort, creating danger of legal 
punishment and so on. However, the different prohibition approaches have 
different effects. Partial prohibition and prohibition with expediency principle are 
not as effective as prohibition with civil penalties and total prohibition without 
exception. The civil penalty approach is not as effective as the total prohibition 
without exception approach. Under a regulation approach, it is expected that the 
consumption rate will increase, because the barriers caused by prohibition are 
vanished. Nevertheless, carefi:lly balanced "sin taxes" are able to influence prices 
to affect supply and demand. 
- Health care costs (see Table 1) -
The different levels of consumption have effects on the ability of the 
approaches to address the created health care costs, as less consumption leads to 
less treatment costs. In theory, prohibition approaches are therefore more 
effective. However, the present high consumption rate results in high health care 
costs, which vary form country to country depending on the approach used. Due 
to the expected consumption increase, a regulatory approach would have to face 
higher health care costs. These costs might slightly be decreased by implementing 
purity requirement or information duties concerning negative health hazards in the 
market place. 
- Information asymmetries (see Table I) -
As prohibition theoretically assumes no consumption at all, the prohibition 
approaches do not provide for special information-supply. However, in 
prohibition with expediency principle end consumers receive, at least, some 
information in coffee-shops. In partial prohibition, the information asymmetries 
exist only to the extent to that consumers use nevertheless the black market 
system. In contrast, regulation allows implementing special features such as 
discloser duties concerning health hazards, but also in regard to the particular 
cannabis product. This minimises the information asymmetries more effective 
than prohibition. 
- Paternalistic concerns (see Table I) -
The prohibition approaches address the paternalistic concerns, but there 
are differences between the approaches. All approaches forbid consumption by 
young people. Nevertheless, they face practical difficulties, because young people 
consume anyway. In partial prohibition and prohibition with expediency principle, 
addicts face even no restrictions. Total prohibition seems to be most effective, 
whereas partial prohibition and prohibition with expediency principle seem to be 
of less effective, because they simplify the access to cannabis for young people. 
Although regulation theoretically creates a licit market for cannabis, it is able to 
address the youth concerns with age restriction, bans, advertisement restrictions 
and the like. However, there is no suitable regulatory tool to address the addict 
problem. The changed cannabis environment as such might encourage addicts to 
ask for help and disburden rehabilitation. 
- Compliance (see public opinion and enforcement/ Table 2) -
However, it is obvious that all approaches face compliance problems. The 
willingness of the citizens to voluntarily comply with the prohibition approaches 
seems to decrease, because public opinion about cannabis is changing. The 
ineffective enforcement of the present approaches intensifies the compliance 
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problem. This leads to a circle consisted of changed public opm1on, non-
compliance and non-enforcement. Whether regulation would be able to break this 
circle is questionable. It is at least more in the line of public opinion. Respect for a 
reasonable cannabis regulation law might lead to more voluntary compliance. 
- Ethkal concerns (see Table 2) -
However, there are still ethical concerns stated by different groups that 
need to be considered. The discussion above shows that none of the approaches is 
able to address all ethical concerns at once. Whereas prohibition generally is more 
in line with conservatives, Christians and parents, regulation meets the interest of 
liberals, some religious groups and medical cannabis supporters. 
- Black markets -
Prohibition leads to black markets, although their effects and costs are 
different in the different prohibition approaches. Total prohibition without 
exception has the most serious black market effects. Under prohibition with civil 
penalties these effects might be less, because of the changed enforcement 
environment. In partial prohibition and prohibition with exception black markets 
exist only to some extend, and therefore the effects are not as serious. In contrast, 
under regulation with carefully implanted regulatory tools, a black market would 
not exist. 
- Costs of enforcement and law changing (see Table 2) -
All intervention approaches require enforcement, while the types of 
enforcement and the cost levels are different. In addition, it seems that regulation 
might reduce the required men power and time. In regard to the "law changing 
costs" is to say that all prohibition approaches are in line with the UN and create 
therefore no changing costs. Regulation, on the other hand, would require set up 
costs in all countries and the UN. It is expected that these cost will be amortised 
by additional revenue. 
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- Market participants (see Table 3) -
If one considers the conditions for the market participant in the different 
approaches, it is obvious that their situation would be better under regulation than 
it is under prohibition. They would have a licit market to purchase in and would 
only face information and transaction costs comparable to other "normal" 
commodities. Prices would reflect preferences and serve as information carrier. 
However, because of the implemented taxes the prices would not be as low as 
they might be in a total free market, but lower than under prohibition. 
Nevertheless, some market participants remain worse off, because they would 
prefer a total free market. In the prohibition approaches, the black market causes 
higher transaction and information costs, and higher prices. Nevertheless there are 
differences between the single prohibition approaches For example, sellers in a 
total prohibition with expediency principle might be partly better off than in the 
other prohibition approaches, because they are, at least, able to sell to end-
consumers under special conditions. On the buyer side, the result is more 
complicated. In a total prohibition with civil penalties, the buyers are also worse 
off, because they nevertheless have punishment to fear, even if it is not a criminal 
record. The same applies for a partial prohibition. In such a system, there would 
be no market at all, even if "cannabis gifts" to adults were allowed. There might 
also be consumers who are better off with such an approach, because 
consumption, at least for adults, and the ability to grow one's own cannabis would 
be allowed. This is different in a total prohibition with expediency principle. 
There the buyers are, at least, able to purchase cannabis in coffee shops even 
under special conditions. This might lead to the result that they are partly better 
off than in the other prohibition approaches. 
- Third parties (see Table 3) -
In regard to third parties, it is to say that although prohibition theoretically 
seems to address externalities more efficient than regulation does, the benefit is 
outweigh by the costs the black market creates. Regulation, on the other hand, 
address externalities more flexible and it allows creating additional revenue to 
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counter the costs. Therefore, it is expected that the same number of third parties 
are worse off in both approaches. 
In conclusion, after comparing the costs and benefits, regulation seems to 
be the superior intervention approach. It has the best performance in the outlined 
cost benefits analysis. 
VIII Conclusion 
Is the most powerful cannabis law the law of supply and demand? The 
consideration of the possible approaches, free market, prohibition and regulation 
comes to the result that the answer to this question is not a clear yes. While a free 
market approach was the starting point for this paper, it was found to be not 
preferable, because it has failures in shape of externalities and information 
asymmetries. Furthermore, it does not address the paternalistic and ethical 
concerns. The prohibition approaches lead to black markets and are not able to 
implement goal-oriented tools to address the desired market outcomes. 
Furthermore, the "laizze faire" enforcement mentality contradicts their 
theoretically possible advantages. Also in regard to the change in public opinion 
concerning cannabis, these kinds of approaches are not timely any more, although 
several moral concerns would be satisfied by prohibition. Regulation is more 
flexible and allows targeting policy goals with special tools. Additionally, it 
provides for revenue. On the other hand, it is not clear yet to what extend the 
enforcement bodies would enforce the regulation law, but this approach would at 
least be in the line with a "modem understanding" of cannabis. 
Regulation is not a call for unrestricted consumption or free purchasing of 
cannabis, it faces the social reality. 
In conclusion, this paper advises a change in the political approaches of 
the UN and its member states. Nevertheless, while considering the details of 
regulation, policy makers should be aware of inadequate information, failure to 
anticipate important side effects of regulatory instruments, and avoidance 
behaviour as that might lead to poor policy analysis. 111 
111 Ogus, above n 15, 56. 
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APPENDIX 
Fig.I Annual prevalence of cannabis use 2003/20041 
Table 8: Annu al prevalence of cannabis use. 2003/04 or latest year available 
Cannabis use 
/11 % of No. of users 
populat/011 aqe 15-64 
EUROPE ~A00.000 5.6 
Nest & c entra I E urcpe 22.~0.0::0 7.3 
south-East Europe 2. lC0.0:0 2.5 
East Europo? s.~"'O.o:o 3.8 
AMEIICAS !UCQ.000 I.I 
Ma1hAm;;,r1c.a 26, 7C0,0J) 10.2 
south America 8,K0,0::0 2.9 
ASIA 53,DJ,O::O 2.2 
OCEANA :UCO.OOO 15.1 
ARICA 37,000.000 I 
GLOBAL 160,900.000 4 B Above global average 
Around glob.ii .r,erage 
D Below global average 
Soureo: ut-coc, Annual P,;port5 QuE5Uonnalr~ Data, Go,1. rei:ora, rel))rt5 of reglona toole;, UtlODC esttnat8. 
Fig.2 Global Drug Use Trend Index- Cannabis 1999-20032 
Fig. 46: Global Drug Use Trend Index - (annabis -
based on expert opinions (country results 
weighted by estimated number of cannabis 
users), 1993-2003 
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Fig. 4 Submitters views on the legal status of cannabis4 
Table 11 : Submitters' views on the legal status of cannabis 
OPTIONS No. % GENERAL CATEGORY No. 
O PTI O A 93 17.5% STATUS Q UO 115 
Pro hibition 
O PTION B 10 1.9% 
Prohibi tion w ith a n 
e xemp t'on fo r 
medicinal purposes 
O PTI ON C 0 0% 
Prohibitio wi th 
e xpediency principle 
O PTI ON D 12 2.3% 
Prohi bitio n w ith forma l 
c a u tion a nd /or re fe rra l 
OPTI O E 16 3.0% D ECRIMINALISATIO 111 
Prohibitio with (i nclud es a third category (57 non-
civ il/ a d m in'stra tive of submissions tna t sp ecific) 
pena lties supp o rte d decrim'nal'sa tio n 
w'thou t specify'ng a mod e ) 
O PTI O F 38 7.1% 
Pa rtia l Pro ibition 
OPTI ON G 278 52.3% LEGALISATIO 285 
Lega lisation a nd 
regula tion 
O PTI ON H 7 1.3% 
Free Tra d e 
o t spec'fc o r no 2 1 3.9% 2 1 
opinion 
TOTA L 475 .. 89.3%· 532 
4 Report of the Health Committee "Inquiry into the public health strategies re lated to cannabis use 
and the most appropriate lega l status" (presented to the House of Representatives, Wellington, 
August 2003), 53. 
% 
2 1.7% 
20.8% 
53.6% 
3.9% 
100% 
Fig. 5 Problems to regular heavy alcohol drinking5 
Social problems Psychok>gical problems Physical problems 
Fam ly problems 
Divorce 
Homelessness 
Work drfficulties 
Unemployment 
Financiai difficul es 
Fraud 
Debt 
Vagrancy 
Habitual convictions for 
drunkemess 
lnson ia 
Depression 
Anxiety 
Atten pted sui cide 
S Clde 
Changes in personalrty 
An esia 
Der n tremens 
Fits of wthdrawal 
Hal ucinosis 
Dementia 
Gan ling 
Misuse o' other drugs 
Fa y liver 
Hepatitis 
Cirrhosis 
Liver cancer 
Gastritis 
Pancreatitis 
Cancer of the mouth, 
larynx, oesophagus 
Breast cancer (?) 
Colon cancer (?) 
Nutritiona deficiencies 
Obesity 
Diabetes 
Cardiomyopathy 
Raised blood pressure 
Strol\es 
Brain damage 
Neuropathy 
Myopathy 
Sexual dysfunction 
lnferti ity 
Feta! damage 
Hemopoie1ic toxicity 
Reactions with other drugs 
Fig. 6 Problems relating to intoxication
6 
Social problems Psychological problems Physical problems 
Family arg men s 
Domes c violence 
Child neg ectlabuse 
Domes c accidents 
Absenteeism from work 
Accidents at work 
lne"'icient work 
P b ic drunkenness 
Footbal hool ganism 
C minal damage 
Theft 
Burglary 
Assault 
omicide 
D nk-driving 
Taking and drivvtg away 
Road tra c accidents 
Sexua y de·,riant acts 
nwanted pregnancy 
Insomnia 
Deoress ion 
Anxiety 
Amnes ia 
A.ttempted sJicide 
Suicide 
Hepatitis 
Gastritis 
Pancreati ·s 
Gout 
Cardiac arrhythmia 
Accidents 
Trauma 
Strokes 
Failure to take prescribed 
medicine 
lmpo ence 
Feta! damage 
5 Nina Rehn wilh Robin Room and Gri ffilh Edwards of Alcohol in Lhe E uropean Region,-
consumption harm a nd polic ies (WHO Regional Office fo r Europe, 200 I), p23. 
6 Nina Rehn with Robin Room and Griffith Edwards of Alcohol in the E uropean Region,-
consumption harm and po lic ies (WHO Regiona l Office for Europe, 200 I), p23. 
Fig. 7 Cannabis Herb: Retail and Wholesale Prices 7 
CANNABIS HERB 
Retail and wholesale prices and purity levels: 
breakdown by drug, region .and country or terr1tory 
(prices e:,µressed in US:$ or corr.,?rt.ed equi·,aent. and purit;• l.?,els in percentage) 
RET All PRICE (per qram) WHOLESALE PRICE (per kiloqram) 
Reqion f countrv or t.erritorv T•,oi:al RarQ= Puritt' Year T•,cical Ranqe Purit; 
Africa 
East Atrtca 
Eritrea 4.0 3.0 5.0 2003 1,100.0 1,00).0 • 1,21:0 .0 1.0 • 
Kenya 0.2 0.1 0.3 2(03 99.0 70.0 · 130.0 
Madagascar 1.3 1.1 1.4 10).0 20:'2 w.o 100.0 
Mauritius 10.1 00.0 · lOJ.O 2CQ2 
SE'Jcheles 4, 140.0 3,600.0. 4,6(0.0 
Ugan:la 0.1 0.03 0.1 2CQ3 lCO.O 5:1.0. 1(0.0 
NnrthAtnra 
Algeria 520.0 
SQ1 l!bi>rn .Mrtca 
Mala·.~i 0.1 2003 
~lamibia 0.5 0.4 0.7 2(03 
Scoth Africa 0.2 0.1 0.2 20C'3 20.0 10.0 - 30.0 
5'A-·aziland 2.0 1.3 3.3 20:03 lOJ.O 70.0 • 130.0 
Zambia 0.2 2(03 1~).0 l~J.O • 170.0 
Zimba:1.,se 0.9 0.5 1.3 9).0 20C,3 60 .0 ~).0. 00.0 90.0 
V,'.,st aod C :rnral Afrtc a 
Burkina Faso 0.2 0.2 0.4 10).0 20C,3 20.0 10.0 • 30.0 10).0 
Congo 0.2 0.2 0.4 2(03 40.0 3)).0. 60.0 
Cote d' t.Dire 0.7 0.1 1.4 2(02 10.0 
Ghana 4 .0 3.0 5.0 2(03 290.0 23)).0. 350.0 
Guinea 10.i) 
Nigeria 0.2 0. 1 0.2 2(03 10.0 
Saint Helena 8.2 2003 8, 175.0 
Togo 0.1 0. 1 0.4 20C,3 130.0 
Americas 
canbbwo 
Bahamas 5.0 5.0 10.0 2003 1.~::0.0 1,50).0 · 2,100.0 
B.,rmuda 50.0 2ca:,2 13,0-..0.0 11 ,000.0 · 11 .~0.0 
Ca1·man Isla n:ls 8.0 6.0 10.0 2002 2,000.0 1,50)!) • 2.~:0.0 
lvbntserrat 5.2 4.7 5.7 2(02 8~).0 75:1.0 • 9-10.0 
Trini:lad Tcbago 1.2 0.8 1.6 2(03 470.0 29J.O . 650.0 10).0 
Turks & Caicos Islands 10.0 2(03 60).0 400.0 · o:o.o 
c~ttal Ami>Wa 
Costa Ri:a 1.0 1.5 2.5 2003 190.0 10).0 · 2C0.0 
El Sal•,ador 1.0 1.0 1.1 2(03 1,070.0 1,000.0 · 1.140.0 
Guatemala 2.5 2.5 3.2 10).0 20:•3 110.0 lOJ.O 
H:mduras 0.3 0.3 0.4 2(03 90.0 70.0 • 120.0 
Ni:aragua 0.1 2(02 140.0 10).0 · 1.IO.O 
No[lhAm!!l:lr.l 
Canada 7.1 7. 1 17.6 0.5 • 24.0 2CQ3 2,820.0 2,120.0 · 4,130.0 0.1 
t.A?xi:o &J.O 10).0 
United States 11A 2(03 2,035.0 770.0 · 3XO.O 4.8 
SQ111b Ami>rtca 
Argentina 3.0 2.0 4.1) 2003 1.7~0.0 1,000.0 • 2.~0.0 
Boli•.ia 0.8 2002 100.0 
Colombia 0.1 2(•)3 3Q.O 10.0 · 70.0 
Ecuador 1.0 1.0 2.0 2003 1,SCO.O 1,00).0 • 2,0:0.0 
Paraguay 0.9 0 .7 1.1 2(02 10.0 
S<Jriname 0.9 0.5 1.4 2((,2 
Uruguay 0.3 0.1 0.5 2(03 20).0 150.0 · 2~0.0 
Venezuela 1.3 1.3 1.6 2(03 130.0 110.0 · 130.0 
Asia 
C~ttal ~~la .io!:I Irac:i:;cawa~1s1 
Armenia 1.8 1.5 2.0 2(03 
Azerbaijan 0.8 0.8 1.0 20:•2 iOO.O 65).0 . 8:0.0 
K1rgyzstan 0.7 0.5 1.0 8.0 . 10.0 2003 10.0 8.0 -
Uzbekistan 700.0 400.0 • l ,CCO.O 
7 UNODC, World Drug Report 2005, above n I, 
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2003 
20(•2 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2002 
2003 
2003 
2002 
1003 
2003 
2003 
2002 
20(•2 
20(•2 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2003 
2002 
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2003 
2003 
2003 
2002 
2003 
1003 
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2003 
2002 
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Fig. 8 Burden of disease attributable to tobacco, alcohol and drugs
8 
Table 17: Burden of disease in 1000 attributable to tobacco, alcohol and drugs by 
de,·eloping .sratu.s and .sex 
Total DAL Ys (OOOs/ 
Smo~ng and oral obacco (%) 
A.cohol (%) 
ll'icrt drugs (%) 
Sou re~. Rehm er al /ill press). 
High mortality developing 
(AFR-0, AFR-E, AMR-0, 
EMR-D, SEAR-0) 
Male Female Total 
4_ 711 41:: O~,::! 832 763 
3A 0.6 2.0 
2.6 05 1.6 
0.8 0.2 0.5 
Low mortality developing Developed 
(AMR-B, EMR-B, (AMR-A, EUR-A, EUR-8, 
SEAR-B, WPR-B) EUR-C, WPR-A) 
Male Femare Total Male Femare Total 
::::3 181 135 316 408 497 117 670 96 543 21<1 213 
62 1.3 <1.0 17 1 6.2 12.2 
9.8 2.0 6.2 14 0 3.3 9.2 
12 03 0.8 23 1.2 1-8 
8 WHO Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse "G lobal Status Report on Alcohol 
2004" (WHO Geneva 2004) p 50, 
Fig.9 Alcohol connected accidents9 
Table 15: Attributable fractfons of acute alcohol-related health effects in the adult general 
population 
Injury 
Motor vehic e 
raffic accidents 
ICD-9 
EB O-E819 
Motor vehic e 
nontra c accidents EB20-EB25 
B cycle acodent 
inJur.es 
01her road ve cle 
accident injuries 
'Nater transport 
accident injuries 
E826 
E829 
E830-E839 
r-space ransport ES40-EB<lS 
accident injuries 
Accidental e anol 
and methane 
poisoning 
Accidental fa 
i Junes 
Arson in.unes 
Accidental 
exces e co d 
Accidental 
drowning 
Accidental 
asoJa ion 
Striking agansc I 
struc by obJects 
Caught n/ 
between objects 
Occupational and 
macni e nJuries 
Accidental firearm 
missf e injuries 
S icide se'f-
i icted Juries 
E860 O-
E860.2 
E8BD-E888 
E890-E899 
E901 
E9 0 
E9 1 
E9 7 
E9 8 
E9 9-E9-
E922 
E950-E959 
1/< ctim 'ig t, brm• , E960 rape 
I/ ctim assault 
'iream1s 
IJ<ccim assault 
cu g ins rumen! 
V'ct1m C Id 
battermg 
V'ccim assault 
other 
E965 
E966 
E967 
E968 
Late effec s o' E
969 ii\ ur.es by another 
USA 
Stinson et al. 
(1993) 
F M 
0 42 042 
0 42 0.42 
0 20 0 20 
0 20 0_20 
AUSTRALIA 
English et al. 
(1995) 
F M 
0.18 0.37 
.18 0 .37 
0.18 0.37 
0.18 .37 
CANADA 
Single et al. 
(1996) 
F M 
0.43 0.43 
0.43 0.43 
0.20 0.20 
0.2 0.20 
0 20 0 20 No data o data 0.20 0.20 
0 16 
1 00 
0 35 
0 45 
0 25 
0.38 
0.25 
0 25 
0 25 
0 25 
0 25 
0.28 
046 
0 46 
0 46 
0 46 
046 
0 46 
0 16 
1-00 
0.35 
0.45 
0.25 
0.38 
0.25 
0 25 
0 25 
0.25 
0 25 
0.28 
0 46 
046 
0 46 
0.46 
046 
0 46 
Jo data o data 0. 16 
l. 
0.3.d 
O.~ 
No data 
0.3'1 
1. 
No data 
No data 
0. 7 
No data 
0.08 
0.47 
0.47 
0.16 
0.47 
1.00 
0.34 
0.44 
o data 
.34 
1.00 
o data 
o data 
0.07 
o data 
0.12 
.47 
0.47 
0.47 
.16 
0.47 
.47 
.OD 
0 13-
0.34 
0.38 
0.25 
0.31-
0.50 
0.25 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.25 
0. 
0.1 9 
0.27 
027 
0_27 
0.1 6 
0.27 
0.27 
0.16 
1.00 
.20-
0.34 
0.38 
0.25 
0.31-
0.50 
0.25 
0 .07 
007 
007 
0.25 
O.~ 
0.31 
0 .27 
0.27 
0.27 
0 .16 
0 .27 
0.27 
AUSTRALIA 
Ridolfo & Stevenson 
(2001) 
F 
0 11for 
deaths (d) 
and ooprtali-
za ions ( ); 
pedestna.ns 
0. 17 (d); 0 06 
) 
No data 
No data 
.00 
0.1.d for age 
<65, 
0.04> = 65 
o.~ 
No data 
0.3.d 
.00 
Noda a 
No data 
0.07 
Noda a 
0_29 
0.47 
0.47 
0.47 
0.16 
0.47 
0.47 
M 
0.33(d); 
024 (h), 
pedestrans 
0.4 (d); .37 
(h) 
No data 
No data 
1 00 
0.22 for age 
<65 
0.1 2> = 65 
0.44 
No data 
0 34 
1.00 
No data 
No data 
0 07 
No data 
0.32 
047 
0.47 
047 
0 16 
047 
047 
Remnrks ·Ra1tges refer to age-specific arrribwablefraciions; minimum ( :, O) and maximum esrimates a,·e shown. 
Sorrrce. Rehm er al (ill press ) 
9 WHO Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse "Global Status Report on Alcohol 
2004" (WHO Geneva 2004) p 48 
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PRIMARY DRUGS OF ABUSE AM ONG PERSONS TREA TI D FOR DRUG PROBLEMS IN EUROPE, 
2003 (or latest yea available) 
Distribution of main drug In percentages 
Amphetamine-type stimulants 
Coun~ Source Year ~lates Cocaine Amph etaml nes 
Austria Gc,,1. 200::n 87.0% -
Albania UNCOC 1((13 97. 1% -
Belarus UNCOC 2(03 70.7% 2.0J% 1.7% 
Belglum Focal ~int Et.IC DDA 2(02 61.3% 15.0% 5.5% 
Bu!Qarla ut.ODC 1 g;ig 96.9% 0.5% 
Croatia UNJDC 2C03 70.4% 0. 5% 1.2 % 
Cyprus UNODC 2C03 69.6% 8.9 % 0.7 % 
Czech Republic UNODC 2003 25.0% 0.3% 52 .8 % 
Da,mark UNCOC 2002 30.1% 25% 3.3% 
Estonia Focal Pant Et.IC ODA K01 53.8% 18.6% 
Finland EMCDD-A 2002 34. 1% 0.2% 34.0% 
France IJNCOC 2001 62.1% 7. 3% 0.9% 
Gemany UNO[X: 2((13 E.6.2% 25.6% 14.9% 
Greece UNODC 1C03 &~.4% Lb% 00% 
FYR of Macedonia UNCOC 2[(13 9~.6% 
Hungary UNJDC 2(03 17 .0% 0.9% 3.6 % 
Ice and UNOOC 2COO 0.1% 7.1% 65.6 % 
Ireland UNCOC 2002 74.7% 1.8% 0.4% 
Italy UNOOC 2C02/3 79.8% 6.9% 01% 
LaMa UNJDC 20J3 44.9% 0.0% 7.5 % 
Liechtenstein UNOOC 2((12 33.3% 8.3% 
Lithuania UNOOC 2003 80.2% 0. 1% 3. 1 % 
Luxembouro EM([IDA 2002 80.0% 6.0% 0.0% 
Malta UNODC 2001 86.8% 3.8% 
Netherlands UNCOC 2002 56.7% 27.5% 1.9% 
Norway Focal ~int Et.IC ODA 2001 58.2% 12.5 % 
Poland Ut•OOC 20J2 39.3% 0 .8% 8.1 % 
Portugal Fo:a I lbint EM.:ODA 1C02/3 67.0% 31.0% 3D% 
Romania Ut•ODC 20)3 74.1% 0 .4% 0.3 % 
Russian Fed. UNJDC 2003 88.4% 0.02% 1.6 % 
Slovakla UNODC 2C03 52.5% 0.8% 17.5 % 
Slovenia UNODC 2(02 90.9% 0.7% 0.2 % 
Spain UNCOC 2002 60.7% 25.5% 0.7% 
Sweden UNCOC 2002 31.1 % 1.2% 38.2% 
Switzerland Go•,t. 2003/2 42.0% 28.9% 0.6 % 
Turkey UNODC 2C01 58.6% 0.0% 
U nlted Kingdom UNCOC 2002 75.0% 6.0% 3.0% 
Europe- average (unwelghted) 62.3% 6.0% 8.2% 
East-Europe - a'lerage (unwelghted) 66.2% 0.4% 7.3% 
West-Europe- average (unwelghted) 59.2% 10.3'k. 8.8% 
• ~ s IYJ1Q thittMrnnl dwirilK>rndrl kif fraTI COU"lty b cOU"l t y 
n 5Cffl e coontriiu paoplll a19 bGmg l18&Gd fer m~ th~n OOQ sub slllnCII; sum cl thG peromlllgGs ffl")' thus Gx.caGd 100~. 
S:ii..r=: LN:C.:, Arruil P,;pcru ~anirQdJ t.i ; B,t:CC•A, C1J b Li~m,. 
Ecstasy Hal lu dnogen s Canna:>ls 
- -
- - - 2.9% 
1.3% 0 .9% 7.4% 
0.8% CIA% 14 .6% 
- - - 1.2 % 
0.6 % 23.7 % 
3 .0 % 16.2 % 
0. 6% - 16.5 % 
0.6% 0.1% 16.7% 
- -
0.6% 0.2% 25.6% 
1.4% 0.9% 23.2% 
13A % 6.9% 58.0% 
0.4% 0.1% 7.8% 
- - OA% 
2 .3 % - 25.3 % 
0.9 % - 26.3 % 
3.1% 0.2% 17.6% 
1.0% 0.1% 9.0% 
- - 1.3 % 
- - 50.0 % 
- - 0.8 % 
0.0% 0.0% 11.0% 
0.7 % 0. 1 % 8.5 % 
0.9% 0.0% 13. 1% 
- - 13.9 % 
- 3.4 % 
1.0% 0.0% 36.0% 
0.1 % - 1.9 % 
- 6.1 % 
0.5 % 142 % 
0.2 % 7.7 % 
1.0% 0.2% 10.2% 
1.0% 0.0% 17.6% 
0.6 % Q3 % 5.6 % 
- 13.0% 
1.0% 0.1% 11.0% 
1.0% 0.3% 14.0% 
0.3% o. l'lo 7.9% 
1.5% 0.5% 18.7% 
Hypnotics 
and lnhaants/ People treated• 
Sedatives solverrts 
- - 11.753 
- 1.185 
2.8% 13A% 128 
1.2% 10,1((1 
1.1 % 1))55 
2.0 % 0.4 % 5,215 
1.0 % 303 
1.7 % 9,137 
27.8 % 4,310 
- 2D34 
3.497 
4.0 % 28,363 
30.1C9 
3.195 
- - ~)3 
33.4 % 15,333 
2,285 
8,596 
0.6 % 181.572 
8.2 % 523 
12 
4A % 2,913 
470 
0. 1 % 1.444 
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11.424 
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0.1 % 19,596 
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343,335 
8.7 % 2. 119 
0.1 % 2,860 
1.3% 46.744 
7.5 % 2,997 
2.3 % 20,3 16 
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PRIMARY DRUGS OF ABUSE AMONG PERSONS TREATED FOR DRUG PROBLEMS IN OCEANIA 
2003 (or latest year available) 
Amphetamie-type stimulants Country and year Source Year Opiates Cocaine Cannabis Amphetamines Ecstasy 
Australia• " Govt 2002..{)3 33.3% 0.4% 36.3% 17.7% 0.6% New Zea land" • • Govt 1998/2003 31.7% 0.4% 23.1% 7.8% Average 32.5% OA% 29.7% 12.8% 0.6% 
• Plea,.? note 1hat treatJTent deflntlcns dl~r fom ca..inty to countr• . 
•• Data for A.lstrala reer t, clo~ drug rea~dtreatm:nt eplso:les a,er tfl? Juy 20J2·JUI)? ~J03 pa-lod (N - 74,ooo', . 
• •• Data for ~~11 ~ .... :fa1d ref a- to 19ga . tie latest~" fer wtich a brea-da,,n of dm~ related treatrrent data has ~ pu~lshed : thi: proportion sh:w11 for .nµle1.3TI1)?S refers t,) 2003. 
The prcp:,1U:onof fl)?thamj:lletamlM P-b~d te~phcne helplnecalli 15 l!Sed as a ~O.ti fort~ lrrp:iitance of fl)?thampheanine In o,-elll treatfl)?nt. 
Inhalants 
3.2% 
1.6o/o 
In 19980.4~. et treatfl)?ntrases CDl):erned amj:lletamlMs: te~phcfle helplnes re~:,rted a rm}::f lncrease •,, th regard to fl)?tham~hetamlM f,:,m0.5~. In lOJ l to 1.4~. In 2c,:,2 & 7 .8Cl'o In 2C03, In p:i 131~1. to ha; ptal rel):'rt:S of la19= II): re.ases In rnelhamp~ amine related ,~. 
People 
Sedatives treated 
- 4.7% 74 592 
38.6% 6489 
21.7% 81,081 
Fig.12 Annual prevalence of cannabis abuse as percentage of the 
population aged 15 - 6412 
CANNABIS 
Annual prevalence of abuse as percentage of the population aged 
15-64 (unless otherwise Indicated) 
AFRICA 
East Afr1ca 
Mauritius• ,2000 7.2 
Kenya .. , 1994 4.0 
Comoros* 2002 2.9 
Ethicpia '*, 1999 2.6 
Somalia, 2002 2.5 
Uganda** 1.4 
Tanzania, United Rep . u, 1999 0.2 
North Africa 
Mcrncco 2003 11.8 
E<1fpt • .. 1 1997 5.2 
Libyan Arab Jamahirrya, 1998 0.05 
southern Afnca 
Zambia• 2003 17.7 
South Africa• , 2002 8.4 
Zimbabwe, 2000 6.9 
Namibia, 2000 3.9 
west .1nd central Afr1ca 
Ghana, 1998 21.5 
Sierra Leone, 1996 16.1 
Nigeria, 2000 13.8 
Mali• , 1995 7 .8 
Angola, 1999 2.1 
Chad, 1995 0 .9 
Cotf> d'Ivoire 1997 0.01 
Sao Tcme Principe, 1997 0.01 
AMERICA 
ceontr.il America 
Guat;;,mala, 2003 9.1 
Belize'*, 2003 6.7 
Panama .. 2003 4.0 
Nicaragua .. , 2002 2.2 
El Salvador\ 2003 2.0 
Honduras•, 2002 1.6 
Costa Rica 2001 1.3 
North America 
Canada, (15+), 2004 14.1 
USA 2003 13.0 
Mexico,(12-65),2002 0 .6 
south Ameonca 
Chile, 2002 5 .5 
Colombia* 2001 4.3 
Argentina, {16-64), 1999 3.7 
Venezwila• , 2002 3 .3 
Ecuador• (12-49) 1995 3.0 
Guyana• , 2002 2.6 
Bolivia, (12-50), 2000 2.2 
Suriname• , 2002 2.0 
Paraciuav* 2002 1.8 
Peru, 2002 1.8 
Uruguay, ( 15-65),2001 1.5 
Brazil, (12-65), 2001 1.0 
12 UNODC, World Drug Report 2005, above n I, 368. 
The Caribbean 
Haiti ', 2000 
Jamaica* 1997 
Barbados*'. 2002 
Grenada•, 2003 
Bahamas• 200 3 
Mcntserrat, 1997 
Dominica, 1997 
ASIA 
central Asia .ind Tr.1nscaucas1a 
Kyrgyzstan\ 2001 
Kazakhstan* 2000 
Uzbehstan• , 2003 
Armenia*, 2003 
Azerbaijan .. , 2004 
Tajikistan *. 1998 
Ne.ir and Mld<lle East / South-We5t Asia 
Philippines .. , 2003 
Cambodia• , 2003 
Macao SAR, China .. , 2003 
Malaysia .. , 2003 
Thailand, (12-65), 2001 
Mvanmar• 2001 
Indonesi a*, 2003 
Lao Pf>ople's Dern. Rep ... , 2002 
China (Hong Kong SAR)•* 
Taiwan provinc,;i, China .... 
Vi,;it Nam .. , 2002 
Japan, 2002 
Republic of Korea•* 
Singapore, 1 998 
Brunei Darussalam, 1996 
Ne.ir and Middle East/ South-West Asia 
Afo h ani stan *'* 
Lebanon*, 2001 
Israel .. , 2001 
Iran, Islamic Republic, 1999 
Pakistan *'. 2000 
Jordan .. , 2001 
Syrian Arab Rep ...... 2002 
Bahrain*-
Oman, 1999 
Qatar, 1996 
south ASla 
Banglade~.tt. 1997 
India 2000 
Maldives, 1 994 
Nepal*, 1998 
Sri Lanka, 2000 
16.10 
10.45 
7 .30 
6 .70 
4.70 
0 .75 
0.05 
6.4 
4.2 
4.2 
3.5 
3.5 
3.3 
5.5 
3.5 
2.6 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
0.7 
0 .6 
0 .5 
0 .3 
0.1 
0.1 
0 .03 
0 .02 
7.5 
6.4 
5 .7 
4.2 
3.9 
2.1 
2.0 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
3.3 
3.2 
1.5 
3.2 
1.5 
CANNABIS 
Annual prevalence of abuse as percentage of the population aged 
15-64 (unless otherwise Indicated) 
EUROPE 
East Europl! 
Russian Federation* , 2003 
Belarus", 2003 
south11ast Europl! 
Bulgaria .. , 2003 
Croatia* , 2 003 
Turkeyt , (15~5), 2003 
Romania .. , 2003 
westl!m ~nd central Europl! 
Spain, 2003 
Czech Rep., 2002 
United Kingdom, ( 16-59), 2003 
France, 2002 
S\l\1tzerland \ 2003 
Luxembourg* , 2003 
Greenland .. 2003 
Germany, (18-50), 2003 
Slovenia'', 2003 
Denmark, (16-64), 2000 
ltali, ( 15-45), 2001 
Austria '*, 2003 
Netherlands 2001 
Liechtenstein .. , 1998 
Ireland, 2003 
Iceland, (18-75), 2001 
Norway, 1999 
Greece, 1998 
Latvia, 2003 
C~prur• , 2003 
Slovakia, 2002 
Portugal, 2001 
Finl and, 2 002 
Hungary, 2003 
Poland, 2002 
Uthuania •(15-66), 2003 
~st onia, (18-70), 1998 
Sweden*, 2003 
Malta, ( 18-65), 2001 
OCEANIA 
Papua New Guinea, 1995 
Micronesia Fed.State., 1995 
Australia 2004 
New Zealand, 2001 
New Caledonia-* 
Fiji, 1996 
Vanuatu, 1997 
3.9 
3.6 
2 .6 
4 .1 
4 .0 
2.6 
1.9 
1.7 
11 .3 
10.9 
10.9 
9.8 
9 .6 
8 .0 
7.6 
7 .6 
6 .8 
6 .2 
6 .2 
6 .2 
6 .1 
6.1 
6.0 
5.1 
5.0 
4 .5 
4.4 
3.8 
3.7 
3.6 
3.3 
3.2 
3.0 
2 .8 
2.4 
2.0 
1.7 
0 .8 
29.5 
29.1 
13.9 
13.4 
1.9 
0 .2 
0 .1 
·uNODC es1imatesbase::t co b:al stujies, spedal pqiula1ico group 
studies, <Wld /cr la-n• enfacement q.ro..-y assessments. 
• • T eota1i·,e estimates. 
Sances: Annua Reports C\Jes1ionnaires, Gcuernment Reports, US 
Department d State, Eurq:,e<Wl Mcoitorirg Ceoter fcr Drugs ard 
Dri.g Abuse (EMCDDA~ 
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Fig.14 
Per Capita Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages (Gallons of Pure 
Alcohol) 1910-1929 13 
Rates of Past Year Use of Marijuana in the USA, 
2000-200414 
40.0 ~------------------------~ 
35.0 +---..=---~~------...:::.;;;;;;;;;..__ 
30.0 +--~~;;:;:=====~====--iii.iii~~:;;:::;;;;::==--~ 
25.0 -+---------------------------
20.0 +----------------------------i 
15.0 1-----'::::~~---===-iiiiiiii.;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;::::::::==-1 
10.0 +----------------------------i 
5.0 -+---------------------------
0.0 +-------.-----~----~----~-------i 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
- Eighth Graders Twelfth Graders - Young Adults 
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13 Clark Warburton, The Economic Results of Prohibition (New York: Columbia Uni versity Press, 
1932), pp.23-26, 72. 
14 National Drug Threat Assessment 2005 Summary Report, Fig.6; source: 
<http//: www. usdoj .gov/ndic/ pubs I I/ 13846/i mages/fig8.g i f> (last accessed 03.07 .2005) 
Fig. 15 Consumption of Cannabis in Some EU countries, USA a
nd 
Australia 2003 
15 
Table 1: Consumption of cannabis in some EU countries, the United S
tates and 
Australia 
Age Taken once or 10re Taken recently 
Unite<l States 14 and over 38% 
10% 
Aus-ralia 14 and over 33% 
13% 
England and Wales 16-59 29% 
11% 
Spain 15-65 25% 
10% 
France 15-65 23% 
8% 
Belgium (Wallonia) 18-49 22% 
? 
Italy 15-44 22% 
6% 
Netherlands 15-65 21% 
6% 
Ireland 18-64 20% 
9% 
Ger any (West') 18-59 19% 
6% 
Greece 15-65 13% 
4% 
Luxe 1bou g 15-65 13% 
? 
Sweden 15-65 13% 
1% 
Finland 15-65 10% 
2% 
Po uga 15-65 8% 
3% 
Source: ational Drug lonitor, _ 3 Annual Report 
15 Hoogervorst, Donner and Remkes ,,Policy on Cannabis" (Parliam
entary Document, 2004) 
<http://www.minvws.nl> 
Table 1 Ability of the different approaches to influence cannabis consumption and to address market failures 
1 
Total free market 
Consumption level High 
Ability to address market failures 
Information (-) 
asymmetries 
Externalities: (-) 
Health care 
costs** 
Paternalism / involuntary choices 
Youth (-) 
Addicts (-) 
(+) 
(-) 
Issue addressed 
Issue not addressed 
2 
Total 
prohibition 
Lower than in 1 
(-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
* 
** 
in regard to the market exchange of cannabis 
assumed that prohibition leads to consumption reduction 
3 4 5 
Total prohibition Total prohibition Partial 
with expediency with civil prohibition 
principles penalties 
Lower than in 1, Lower than in 1 Lower than in 1, 
but higher than in and 3, but higher but higher than in 
2 than in 2 2 and4 
More effective (-) (-)* 
than 1 and 2 but, 
less than 6 
More effective More effective More effective 
thanl, but less than 1, but less than 1, but less 
than 2 than 2 than 2 and 4, might 
equal 3 
More effective More effective More effective 
than 1, but slightly than 1, but slightly than 1, but slightly 
less than 2 less than 2 less than 2 
More effective More effective More effective 
than 1, but slightly than 1, but slightly than 1, but slightly 
less than 2 less than 2 less than 2 
6 
Regulation 
Lower than in 1 
but higher than 2, 
4 and 5 
(+) 
More effective 
than 1, but less 
than 2,3,4, and 5 
More effective 
than 1, but slightly 
less than 2 
More effective 
than 1, but slightly 
less than 2 
Table 2 Comparison: Impact on the black market, addressing 
ethical concerns, public opinion, enforcement and costs 
1 
Total free market 
Black market (-) 
Ethical concerns: 
Conservatives (-) 
Christians (-) 
Parents (-) 
Liberals (+) 
Religious groups (+) 
Med. cannabis use (+) 
Public opinion Is not in the line of 
the public opinion 
Enforcement 
Enforcement costs (-) 
Changing costs (+) 
Satisfied / Issue addressed 
Dissatisfied I Issue not addressed 
2 
Total prohibition 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(-) 
(-) 
Is not in the line of 
the public opinion 
grey zones(+) 
(+) 
(-) 
(+) 
(-) 
(<+) 
(>-) 
Not completely satisfied, but rather better off 
Not completely dissatisfied, but rather worse off 
3 
Total prohibition 
with expediency 
principle 
(+) 
(<+) 
(<+) 
(<+) 
(>-) 
(>-) 
(>-) 
More in the line of 
the public opinion 
than 1 
grey zones ( +) 
(+) 
(-) 
* Whether there would be grey zones in a regulation approach is not clear 
4 5 6 
Total prohibition Partial Regulation 
with civil prohibition 
penalties 
(+) (+) (-) 
(<+) (<+) (-) 
(<+) (<+) (-) 
(<+) (<+) (<+) 
(>-) (>-) (+) 
(>-) (>-) (+) 
(>-) (>-) (+) 
More in the line of More in the line of Seems to be in the 
the public opinion public opinion line of the public 
than 1 than 1 opinion today 
grey zones ( +) grey zones ( +) grey zones* 
( + ), lower than in ( + ), lower than in (+) lower than in 
2 , but higher than 2,3 and 4 2,3,4 and 5 
in 3 
(-) (-) (+) 
Table 3 Comparison: Impact on market participants, consumers and third parties 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Total free market Total prohibition Total prohibition Total prohibition Partial Regulation 
with expediency with civil prohibition 
principle penalties 
Market participants 
Buyer (+) (-) (>-) (-) (>-) (<+) 
Seller (+) (-) (>-) (-) (>-) (<+) 
Consumers (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (+) 
Third parties being (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
affected by 
externalities 
( +) Satisfied 
(-) Dissatisfied 
( <+) Not completely satisfied, but rather better off 
(>-) Not completely dissatisfied, but rather worse off 
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